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7he Chancellorinterrupting himn said, 'What, More, you wish to be considered H'A'er arod of better conscience than al the bishops iand nobles of the
redin?' To this More replied, 'My Lord, l6r one bishop of your opinion I
have a hundred Sa11ts of mine; and for one pauiament of'yours, ud God
knows of what kind, I have all dhe Generaid Councils lbr 1,000 yejus, aid lbr
one kingdom I have F,'nce and dl the kaingdomns of Cluistendon.'
For now, though, it seems that the chancellor rides again. And ifthe
the sac/dle, then his iot is hack Hi tie stkrvp.'
ciancelloris back ill
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THR EE STATES

"The sinuous Colorado River and its slew of man-made reservoirs lorn
the Rockies to southern Arizona are being sapped by 14 years of drought
nearly unrivaled in 1,250 years."' Indeed, "many experts believe the current
drought is only the harbinger of a new, 'drier era in which the Colorado's flow
will be substantially mad pernanently diminished." California has also endured a harsh drought.' California's drought is extraordinary, as the United
States Geological Survey reports that "California's 2014 Water Year, which
ended September 30, 2014, was the third driest in 119 years of record."
Conditions in New Mexico have resulted in the state's "worst drought since
[thel 1880s."'
The effects of drought in the West risk being felt on a national level. In
2012 California's 80,500 ranches and larnms were the nation's top producers of
almost eighty crops and livestock. products ranging from almonds to scquab.'
The same year, Colorado's 36,300 ranches and farms were among the nation's top ten producers of products ranging from cantaloupe to lkntb.' New
Mexico's 23,800 farms mid ranches were among the top ten producers of

1. PAUL STROHM, CONSCIENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCrION 22 (2011).
2. Samuel L. Bray, ?The Supreme Court and die Vew Equity, 68 VAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 60), available at http://papers.ssrn.conl/so13/pal)crs.cfi ? abstractid=2436614.

3.

Michacl Wines, C'olondo River l)rought J.rvces a lPaifilReckonig fbr States, N. Y.

TInr-S, Jan. 5, 2014, lit ti)://www.nytimes.coin/2014/0 1/O6/tIs/coloirado-ivertrotight-lorces-apainful-reckoning-lor-statcs.htnil?Pr-0.

4. Id.
Calilbni'a Drought, CA.cOV, http://ca.gov/droight/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).
6. Cal. Water Sci. Cr., Cdifrinia Drought Inlbrmation, U.S. Gt;/O1.OCICAI, SURV.,
http://ca.watcr.usgs.gov/data/drought/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
7. John Fleck, New MAexico miits Worst Droughl Sioce 1880s, ALBUQUFRQUEJ., Feb. 18,
2014, ltthp://www.aqoLiua.cojm/354854/ews/iew-iexicos-droLughtwoirst-since-1 880s.html.
8. NAT'L AGR1C. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEt'r OF AGRIC., CALIFORNIA ACRIcuirURAI.
STATISTIcs 2012 CROP YEAR 1 (2013), availahle at http://wwv.nass.usda.gov/Statistics-byState/
California Dep't of
Califoniia!ubliealions/CaliforniaAgStatisfics/Reports/20l2cas-all.)dl';
Food aid Agric., Califomnia Agicultual Broduction Slatislics, CA.GOV,http://wwV.cdfa.ca.gov/
statistics/ (last visited Apr. 12,, 2015).
9. NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., COLORADO AGRICUurURAL
STATISTIcs 2013, at 2 (2013), ai'aiable at http://wwwmv.nass.usda.gov/StatisicsjyState/
Colorado/hlblications/Ain nualStatistical_Bulletin/Bulletin2013.pdl'.
5.
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products ranging from pecans to calves.'" These western states predict significant population growth in the future as well. California projects that its population will swell by almost fifteen million people hy 2060." Colorado forecasts
that its population will grow by almost 2.5 million by 2040. 2 New Mexico's
population may grow by almost seven hundred thousand by 2040.'"
These three states are pivotal for an understanding of water rights.'4 Each
state follows the doctrine of prior appropriation, which enjoys constitutional
protection in Colorado and New Mexico, and statutory protection in California.'5 In Colorado and New Mexico, prior appropriation is exclusive. In California, prior appropriation coexists with the riparima doctrine.'6 Colorado is a
major water rights jurisdiction. Over the past few years, the Colorado Supreme Court has issued a number of opinions bearing on the doctrine of prior appropriation. New Mexico has innovated the "Colorado Doctrine." California is a foil for the strict application of the appropriative regime.
Each day, roughly lorty-six million Americans are subject to some lorm of

10. NAT'i. Actuc. STATISTICS SEIRV., U.S. DI"'T oiF Aciuc., NEW MEXIco 2012
AGRICULTURAL STATISTIcs 4, 11 (2013), avalable at http://www.nass.usda.gov/Staisics-by_
State/NewMexico/Publicatons/Ainual_StaisticalBulletin/2012/2012_NMPu.plf'.
11. Cal. Dep't of Fin., Jeport P-li: Surmmy PopulationProjections by Racc/Ethnicit'y and
By Major Age Groups, CA.GOV, http://www.dof.ca.gov/rescarc/dcmographic/reports/ projections/P-l/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (webpage providing access to population projection
spreadsheets).
12. Cindy DeGroen, Population hbrecasts, Coi.o. DEP'T OF LOCAL AFF. (Nov. 2012),
http://wvw.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite%31q)lobcol%3Durldata%26blol)hcadername 1%
3DContent-Disposition%26blobheadername2%3DContent-Type%26blobheadervaluel %
3Dinline%253B%2Bfilenanm%253D%2522Population%2BProjctions.l)df%2522%
26blobheadcrvalue2%3Dapplication%252Fpdl%26blobkey o3Did%26blobtable%
3DMungoBlohs%26blobwhere%3D 1251833653289%26ssbinia-yLDtrue.
13. UNM Geospatial and Population Studies Group, Population Pi'jectionslbr New Mexico and Counties, UNM BUREAU OF Bus. AN) EcON. RESEARCH, http://bber.unm.edu/demo/
lPopProj'able 1.htn (last updated Dec. 4, 2012).
14. I use the tern "rights" similarly to David Takacs. Takacs explains:
"Rights" are legal privileges that may be temporary or fungible. For example, when I
quote the California Constitution below on the "right to water," I am discussing a limited "right": it can easily (at least when compared with rights or rights) be revoked or
conditioned. These "rights" correspond to what Sax refers to as usufructary, a "right"
that incorporates the interests; of others and thus a "right" that one does not own "in
the same way he owns his watch or his shoes."
See David Takacs, The Public 7 ust Doctrine, ElnitroninentalHuman Rightq, and the Future
ofPrivate Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENNTL. L.J. 711, 721-22 (2008). The scope of my argument is
narrower than Takacs's, as I focus on state law in tie United States while Takacs engages with
international human rights as part of his discussion of the public trust doctrine.
15. Co o. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1414
(2014). See also CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (enshrining the beneficial use requirement).
16. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTrSHELL 8 (4th ed. 2009). There are several
other states that use a similar system, including California, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. I. (explaining that these
states "originally recognized riparian rights, but later converted to a system of appropriation
while preserving existing riparian rights."). In riparian systems, "the owner of the ripaian land,
i.e., land bordering a waterbody, acquires certain rights to use the water. Each riparian landowner may make reasonable use of the water on the riparian land if the use does not interfere
with reasonable uses of other riparian owners." Id. at 16.
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prior appropriation in these three states.' 7 The doctrine generally provides
that the first person to divert water from its source for a recognized beneficial
use holds a superior right to subsequent users.'8 The doctrine governs tie use
of surface, underground, and other sources of water. It affects farming, ranching, and recreational activities involving streams and rivers, and it has bearing
on the river habitats of endangered and other species. Indeed, the state agencies that make water available to millions of Americans for a number of domestic uses in the West each day are subject to some form of tie appropriative regime.'" Prior appropriation is thus intertwined with western economic
and social livelihood.
B. EQIJITABILE APPORTIONMENT

In water matters, western litigants have relied on a range of legal remedies
to indicate their water rights in prior appropriation cases, not least anong
which are equitable remedies. 0 Equity and prior appropriation are often ad-

17. 2014 Populalion Esinmates, US CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2014), http://facttinder.census
.gov/taces/tahleservices/jsl/pages/producview.xhtln?src=l)kntk. The prior appropriation doctrine governs water rights in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Utiah, and Wyoming. GETCH.S, sjpra nole 16, at 7.
18. Gclches, supni- note 16, at 6.
19. Id.
20. A remedy can be described as follows:
The remedy is what the client gets, the practical pavoll of litigation, the bottom line of
justice. Even when the client cares about the precedent, the precedent is impotant
because it will lead to tic grant or denial of remedies in fture cases, and because the
deterrent eflect of those remedies, or the prospect of not having to worry about any
more rtemedies, will guide the defendant's behavior. Without the prospcct of an effectivc remnedy, a claim of right is meaningless.
Douglas Laycock, Spnposium Remedies: Justi~c and the Bottom Line Introductioi, 27 REV.

LrTIG. 1, 2 (2007). Additionally:
A "remedy'," as I use the tenn in this Article, is what a civil court can do on hehalf of
a claimant who has prevailed on the substantive legal issues. A remedy difl ers frot
the procedural path that a plaintiff's lawsuit takes through the system and the substantive rules the court applies. This Article takes a fluid, contextual view of a court's
characterizations as remedy, procedure, arnd substance; it assumes the characterization will often depend on the coittr's put)osc and may vary from decision to decision.
There is nothing to be gained from characterization in the abstract as remedy, proce(lure, or substauce. Moreover, it %Vill often be a mistake for a court to use a characterization for one purpose in an unrelated context.
Doug Rcndlemnan, hrreparal1ity ?esurrected?: )oes a IRecalib,ated heprablnle htfiy Rule
Thrneaten the 'VanWen Court's Estalishncnt Clause LqIcy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343,
1353 (2002). However:
This Article rejects any theory of remedies that segregates right from remedy. "As
a work of art, so adjcctive or reform cannot always be separated from substance ill
" Instead, it sugmedial aspects cannot be parted entirely from substantive ones ...
gests that the "unified right theory" of remedies - in which the remedy and the delinitional guarantee are two components of the unified substantive whole-more
appropriately describes tie real interrelationship between these two legal conceplts.
Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Sect'on .5 Power and Remcal' Rightl.,

34 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
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dressed in the context of equitable apportionment. Although equitable apportionment arose as early as 1907 in Kansas v. Coloi-ado, equitable apportionment of the Colorado River's waters among western states was only codified in
the Colorado River Compact of 1922." The 1922 Compact's major objectives
include provision "for the equitable division and apportionment of the use of
the waters of the Colorado River System. " '
Numerous federal courts have since interpreted equitable apportionment
between the states. The inost compelling line of cases is that chronicling the
decades-long battle between Arizona and California (which includes US Supreme Court decisions in 1931, 1934, 1936, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1979, 1983,
1984, and 2000).3 In the most recent iteration of that contest, the United
States Suprene Court held that it would not preclude a Native American tribe
from asserting rights to a greater share of the Colorado River's water.2' As
comnentators have noted, equitable apportionment has procedural and substantive implications based on fairness.' Indeed, in "all of the equitable apportionment cases before 1963, the Supreme Court discussed fundamental
fairness, equity, and flexibility in the application of the doctrine."'
C. EQUITABLEJUSTICE
Although there are many ways to understand equity, one way to define it
is holistically. Under this definition, equity can include notions of participatory justice attentive to the multiple values attributed to water in a given place.
Equity can imply environmental justice concerns, equal political access, and
sensitivity to the effects of water-related decisions on disfavored communities.3
It can also imply social justice that is responsive to political and econonic
concerns.' Equity can be deployed to examine comity concerns in international treaties governing water.' Equity*can mean that, "one person's use of

673, 687-88 (2001) (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 116 (1945) (Rutledge, J.,

dissenting)).
21. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1311 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (2014); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-15-5 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-12a-3 (LexisNexis 2014); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 41-12-301 (2014); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 104-05 (1907).
22. COlO. RWUER COMPACr art. 1 (1922); CoLO. Rrv. STAT. § 37-61-101 (2014).
23. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Arizona v. Califonia, 292 U.S. 341 (1934);
Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936); Arizona v. Califonia, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Arizona
v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964); Arizona v. California, 383 U.S. 268 (1966); Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); Arizona v. California,
466 U.S. 144 (1984); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000).
24. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 418 (2000).
25. SeeJason A. Robison & Douglas S. Kenney, Equity and the Colorado River Compa, t,
42 EN\rL. L. 1157, 1173-76, 1208 (2012).
26. Richard A. Simms, Equitable Apportionment - Priorities and New Uses, 29 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 549,558 (1989).
27. See Thomas Clay Arnold, 7he San Luis Valley and the Moral Econony of Water, in
WATER, PLACE, ND EQUrry 37,38 (John M. Whiteley et al. eds., 2008).
28. See Sheldon Karnieniecki & Amy Below, Ethical Issues in Storm 14Water Policy Implementation: Dispanties in Financial Burdens and Overall Benefits, in 'VATER, PLACE, AND
EQUry, supra note 27, at 69, 78-79.
29. See Margaret Wilder, Equity and Water in Mexico's ChangingInstitutionalLrndscape,
in WATErR, PLACE, AND EQUrrY, supra note 27, at 95, 95-96.
30. See Stephen P. Mumme, From Equitable Utilization to Sustainable Development: Ad-
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[rivers and the fish in themi should not preclude or damage another person's
use or enjoyment of them, without formal assent and compensation for losses." 3' It can mean that "democratic participation and active citizenship" are
necessary elements of a water privatization policy."
A holistic view of equity includes other definitions. It might also attend to
the local context, which is often subordinated to national and international
Indeed, equity might mean that, "although fornal institutional
concerns.'
rules are a necessary condition for participation, they are by no means sufhicient to foster effective participation, both in terms of outcome (i.e., more eflicient and eqtuitable management) and process (i.e., more democratic, transparent, and accountable decision making)."' In this sense, "equity can only be
served through processes of decision making that reflect the full range of valties with which water is associated."'
A holistic view of equity is concerned with the future of a scarce resource,
and its effects on communities across the globe.' Under this view, which is
primarily concerned with social and environmental justice ("equitable justice"),
"later will dominate world natural resource politics by the end of the twentyfirst century much as oil dominated the late twentieth century.""7 As that possibility becomes more distinct, the commodification of water, alone, cannot
address the many values attached to water. ' Equitable justice concedes that
economic incentives can be successful.' Nevertheless, efficiency is only one
tool aunong many.'
Equitable justice's desire to acknowledge and address the effects of past
injustices on historically disfavored communities reflects its concern for cornmunities across the globe." Some elfects can be "irreversible-or, at least, dill
Equitable justice demands a "strong sense of injustice"
licult to reverse."
which can include "indignation or anger followed by a policy response on a

viancing Equity in US.-Mexico Border Water Managemlent, in WATER, PLACE, AND EQurrY,
supi note 27, at 117,118.
31. Paul W. Hir, Developing a Plentilil Rescource: iTalishoullan, Rive:s inl hc Pacilic
Northwest, In WxrE,

PIACE, AND

EQUrY, supria note 27, at 147, 162. For Hirt, prior appro-

priation is thus inimicd to equity because it privileged the interests of "private enterprise" 1o the
detlriment of others. Id. at163.
32. Madeline Baer, The Globad ater Cinsis, Privat2Ltin, and ihe Bolivian 14'Vlter Wll,
in WATER, PI ACE, AND EQUrIY, SUpia note 27, at 195, 218-19.
33. See Ismael Vaccaro, Modernizing Mountai Wat1er State, Industry, and Teritoo, in
WATER,PlACE, AND EQurry supra note 27, at 225, 226.
34. Maria Carmen Lemos, lhose Water Is It An_- ay? Water Management, Knowledge;
and Equitvin NortheastB-alil, ,n WATER, PIACE, AND EQUIrTY, supra note 27, at 249, 250.
35. Helen Ingramn et al., Water and Eqjuity in a Changing Climate, in WATER, PLACE, AND
EQurI, supi-a note 27, at 271, 271.
36. See Helen Ingun et al., The Importance of Equity anod the lnits of EIllciency in 1Vter ResoUtces, 1i' WATER, PIACE, AND EQurrY, supia note 27, at 1, 1.

37. Id.
38.
39.

See id.at 3-8.
See id.at 5.

40. Id. at 5,8.
41. David L. Feldman & Michelle \Vhiuman, As ifEquityMa'ttered-Comimllon Themes and
EndulingIsues in die Svmposiun, 50 NAT. RESOURCF.l]. 291,294-300 (2010).

42. Id. at 305.
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geographically far-flung scale."' It might include "the power to seek redress
lor prior wrongs," and it envisages inclusive ways of resolving conflicts regarding contested resources.' Most compellingly, equitable justice proposes an
extension of the vocabulary and assumptions pertaining to natural resources.
Not only should human communities be the subjects of greater sensitivity in
discussions of contested resources, but so too should other species.' Equity
should incorporate discussions of empathy, however challenging the turn to
empathy might initially appear.' Equity should become so entrenched in the
human experience that it results in "values, actions, and laws promoting sustainable pathways that maximize the health and potential of all individuals,
communities, and ecosystems.""
D. EQUITABLE REMEDIES

Equity also refers to a class of legal remedies. For John D. Leshy, interloctitory injunctive relief-an equitable remedy-plays a prominent role in environmental litigation, and Leshy is invested in providing a "[pirilner lor the
IpIractitioner."' By focusing on the plaintiff in federal environmental cases,
Leshy shows that the availability of interlocutory relief is a matter of timing
and strategy." Although standards apply to preliminary injunctive relief, individual facts have great bearing on the outcome at equity, and "ItIhere is almost
never any sound strategic reason for holding back important factual evidence
6r legal arguments. " '° The plaintiff should document the nature of the threatened irreparable harm, which can amount to a showing of standing.5' Showings of irreparable hanr, however, can be difficult where there is incremental
damage, cumulative harm, or where the harm is uncertain or latent 2 Courts
engage in a "mysterious process that results in a judgment."'" A "strong presumption" favors legislative and agency actions, and courts encourage environmental lawsuits by requiring a nominal bond as surety.5 '
For Douglas Laycock, the inferior instinct in remedies is "segregationist,"

43. Id. at 297-98.
44. I. at 300-03.
45.
46.

Id. at 306-14.
Id. at 306-08. "Empathy" in this context seems a fluid tenn since it also embraces the

protection of endangcred and threatened species, and includes both "tie moral capacity to regard non-sentient beings as objects to be cared for and to be regarded as having intrinsic-not

merely utilitarian-value," anod "comnunicatling, negotiatlingl, or engaglingl in an inter-active
decisional process so as to acknowledge not only the moral standing of these organisms, but
also tie possibility that they have 'agency' (i.e., tie ability to act independently)." Id.
47. Takacs, supra note 14, at 760 (emphasis in original).
48. John D. Leshy, Inicrlocutoy Injunctive Relief in Environmental Cases: A Pnmner lor
the JPractitionei;6 ECOLOGY L. Q. 639, 639 (1977).
49. Id. at 654 ("Environmental cases are not all brought by those seeking greater protection
for tie environment. Increasingly, as new environmental regulations seek to change traditional
industrial modes of behavior, industrics are instituting litigation seeking to delay or avoid such

regulation.").
50. Id.at 643.
51. Id.at 644-45.
52. Id. at 647-54.
53. Id at 658.
54. Id. at 662-63, 671-75.
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as exemplified in Delaware.i In Delaware, equity exists as a "separate and
self-conscious" remedial regime that fancies itself somewhat aristocratic.56 Tile
superior approach is Laycock's "integrationist" approach, for which a remedy's history is "wholly irrelevant," and "lwle should invoke equity just as we
invoke law, without explanation or apology mad without a preliminary showing
that this is a case for equity. " For Laycock, equity has emerged victorious, as
the merger of law and equity has incorporated equitable "innovations" into the
"
law and rendered the distinction between the law and equity meaningless.
Legislatures "should quit enacting references to law and equity" as "judges and
lawyers no longer understand what such references mean," including the Supreme Court of the United States, which displayed its misunderstanding of
equity in an opinion.
Laycock argues that judges have largely abandoned the irreparable injury
rule, which allows equitable remedies only when legal remedies would be inadequate. Except where fungible goods can be replaced in an orderly market, courts find damages insufficient, resulting in a rebuttable "preference for
specific relief if Ithel plaintiff wants it."' In fact, specific relief is not only
available at equity. "IWihether we call such a command legal or equitablemandamnus or injunction-is a natter of history and doctrine, not a matter of
function." ' History itself shows that the irreparable injury rule has been on
the decline.' Only in "remarkably few" cases that amount to "remnants" of
the rule do courts apply it, including in cases where courts "are hostile to the

Douglas Lvcock, The 7T'iumph ofEcluiti; 56 IA\w & CONTEMP. Pitis. 53, 53 (1993).
d. While Laycock does not use "intferior" and "superior," he does argue that his view
56.
is de sounder one, and he deploys "segregationist" 2uod "integrationist" in this regardt. d.
55.

57.
58.
59.
60.
688-89
61.
62.

IcLat54.
kI.at 81.
Id.
Douglas Laycock, 77c Death of the hreparable Iuo,Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV.687,

(1990).
hd at691,767.
i.at 697. Rencleman adds:

An Establishment Clause plaintiff has two alternative remedies instead of an injunction: a writ of ms(lanuis in a state court or a (cclaratoly judgment in either federal or state court. Although some state-court Establishment Clause plaintiffs have
sought injunctions, other state-court Establishment Clause plainitlis have sued for
mandamus. Generally, a court grants a plaintiff mandamus to order "a public officer
to carly out a ministenal duty about which the lofficeri had no discretion." Mandamus is the equivalent of an injunction, ithout, however, an irreparable injury rule.
A state court's writ of mandaunts hats both am injunction's compulsory feature
lor the defendant and its preventive quality for the plaintiff. A writ of mnandamus (iftkrs somewhat from an injunction. A mandamus is coercive relief at "common law,"
an extraordinary or prerogative writ issued by a court of law, not a court of chancery
or equity. A writ of mandanuis is limited to guiding a public official's specific ministerial functions that the court can supervise easily. In short, the court cannot use
mandamus to correct all the misconduct the court can enjoin.
Rendleman, supir note 20, at 1365.
63. Laycock, supra note 60, at 698-701; see also Douglas Laycock, Iffinclons and the IrrepaableIfmry iule, 57 T-X. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (1979) (reviewing OWEN M. Fiss, THE Civitl.
RICHTS INJUNCTION (1978)).
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plaintiffs case on the merits." " Courts should thus be freed of the rule.
While the Supreme Court can accomplish this with a sweeping opinion, a legislative solution is more promising.'
"ILless hostile" to the irreparable injury rnle, Doug Rendleman is concerned that Judge Gerald B. Tjollat of lhe Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit would change the threshold inquiry for an injunction. ' Judge Tjoflat
would only apply the irreparable injury rule in the plaintiff's favor if he "can
enforce the plaintiffs proposed injunction with coercive contempt."" However, if judge Tjoflat's "only responses to a defendant's violation would be compensatory contempt and criminal contempt," he would not issue an injunction
because he would conclude that an adequate remedy was available at law.
For Rendleman, Judge Tjoflat's view constitutes either a "frontal assault" or
"an indirect incursion" on the Warren Court's Establishment Clause legacy,
in
which injunctions "play indispensable roles" because conversion of a plaintiffs
complaint into monetary awards can be very difliculty" According to Rendleman, "Itihe world is too complex and future events are too unpredictable for
the judge, when asked to grant an injunction, to be able to predict the injunction, the defendant's violation, and the available solutions."
A judge should
find monetary danages inadequate when: "a) the plaintiffs substantive right is
too important to allow the defendant to violate it and pay damages; b) the subject matter of the dispute may be unique; or c) the plaintiff's injury may be difficult or impossible to monetize."'
More recently, Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden, and Henry E. Smith"2

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Laycock, supra note 60, at 723, 755.
Id. at 770.
Rendleman, supira note 20, at 1345, 1376.
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id. at 1344-45, 1359, 1406. Moreover, as Rendleman argues:

The judge ought not allow a defendant to thwart the plaintitl's Establishment Clause
rights and pay her money danages, if indeed money damages are possible or feasible.
This is because money damages would transmogrify the plaintiffs constitutional right
to be free of oflicially sanctioned religious observances in fact into a right the defendant can invade and covert into an inferior and often illusory right to money.

Id at 1406.

70. Id. at 1400.
71. Id.at 1374.
72. Smith disagrees with Laycock and Rendleman regarding equity's place:
Some commentators such as IDouglas] Lavcock have called into question whether
this requirement of irreparable injury actually holds true. As Laycock has argued, the
irreparable injury cases (in which damages are found to be inadequate, thus paving

the way for an injunction), seem to be all over the lot. It is hard to give an example
that would be worth litigating that some court or other has not fbund to meet the criteria for irreparable injury (hence the "death" of the rule). But if equity is,as I argue,
a decision-making mode that is directed against hard-to-prove opportunism, we
should not be asking for a rle in tie first place. Therc is little point in tracing tie
outer contours of the cases to find such a rule, because what is really going on, according to this theory, is an effort to stop opportunism.

Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 24 (Oct. 22, 2010) (unpublished
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("Gergen et al.") have expressed alarm at a Supreme Court opinion, eBay nc.
v MercExchnmge, L.L.C, which imposed a four-part test lor permanent injunctions in patent cases.73 For Gergen et al., eBay has "overrun and abrogated prior judicial approaches, all in the name of restoring traditional equity
practice."" The opinion is a "doctrinal straitjacket of a sort that courts sitting
in equity have commonly resisted."7 It obscures and "relegatlesi ...to second class status" the highly nuanced traditional approach of courts at equity,
which rely on a panoply of detailed equitable criteria, ranging from equitable
maxims to rebuttable presumlptions and safety valves in their determination of
a case" Such equitable criteria endow equity with predictal)ility. The eBay
test disturbs that predictability and is even more troubling because federal and
even state court decisions "have left in tatters any notion that the significance
of the Supreme Court's el3avtest will be largely confined to patent law or even
intellectual property law more generally.""
A specific concern for Gergen et al. is that the eBavtest has a noisome effect on the complex and more traditional judicial approach to injunctions."
That approach is sensitive to "historlies] of continued infringement," as well as
other "triggers" like "difliculty of measuring danages, difficulty of purchasing
substitutes, or violations of civil rights," which the eBay test elides."' Significandy for Gergen et A., traditional injunctive relief served as a counterweight
to opportunism, which restrains acts that might be compensable or objectionable at law (e.g., trespass, preventing a murderer from proliting from the will
of a victim). As such, equity serves as a moral or ethical antidote to opportunism, which prohibits the conduct of "bad-faith violators.""
manuscript),avaial)lc at

http://wv.law.vale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmidi-L-wVersus Faluity7.pd fl.
73. Mark P. Gergen et al., The Suprlme Courls Accidental Revolution? The Test I6r
Pemmicni Iunctions, 112 CoLUM. L. RFv. 203,204 (2012). As Gergen ct al.explain:
[Tj he Court stated that to obain such au injunction the 1novmt must show: "(1) that
it has suffered an inreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering tie
halace of hardships between de plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and (4) that die public interest would not be disscrved by a permanent injtnc'
tion. "

Id. (quoting eBay Inc. v. McivExchge, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
74. IcL at 206.
75. I at211.
76. Id. at 208, 219-20.
77. I. at 214.
78. Id. at 233.
79. I. at 236-37.

80. I. at 237-38.
81. Id. at 239. For some, Gergen etal.'s work will bring to mind Calabresi and Melamed's

work on property and liability rules, and they will want to know ifmy argument is not a recitation of Calabresi and Melaned's argument under a different guise. Calabresi and Melamed
deal witl entitlements, which are determinations made by tie slate to sanction one interest in-

stead of another. Calabresi and Melamed identify three types of entitlements. The first is protected by propery rules, which assume a voluntary transaction between a buyer and seller, in
which tie parties to the bargain decide its value. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
PIoperty Rules, LIabililv Ru/es, and Imdicnabilitw One View of the (thedraI, 85 HARv. L.
Riv. 1089, 1092 (1972). The presence of property rules is generally reflected in grants of
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Henry Smith's "holistic" and "functional" approach to equity underscores
equity's "individualized justice" in its fight against opportunistic conduct,
which is often only clear in hindsight."5 For Smith, equity is an exceptionally
rich and textured remedial province with history, rules, and vocabulary of its
ownl." Although the historical aspect matters less for Smith's argument, it is
implicit in his attention to equitable maxims, which "have not disappeared.""
So, for example, the maxim that equity acts in personun and not Li rein applies to decrease third-party infornation costs (such as those of a good-faith
purchaser) by acting against the person of the opportunist (with a finding of
contempt, for example) in his attempt to benefit from the purchaser's lack of
knowledge.' In such a case, the court does not invalidate the transaction (j i
rein), but enforces "its direct action upon the person tailored to a particular
problem."
E. PRIOR APPROPRIATION
While no commentators appear to have dealt with equitable remedies,
equitable justice, and prior appropriation, equitable justice is implicit in many
treatments of prior appropriation.Y Charles F. Wilkinson's influential proc"mandatory relief (an injunction or no liability)." THOMAS W. MERRILL, HENRY E. SMITH,
PROPERTY: lPRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 58 (2007). The second type of entitlement is protected
by liability rules, in which the entitlement's value is objectively set, not by the parties to the bargain, but by the state in "what amounts to a forced sale." Id.; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
.81, at 1092. Awards of damages are generally evidence of the presence of liability rules. The
third type of entitlement is "inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a
willing buyer and a willing seller," and the state will intervene to "determine who is initially entitledl, to determine the compensation that must be paid if thc entitlement is taken or destroyed,
landl also to forbid its sale under some or all circumstances." Calabresi & Melarned, su.pra
note 81, at 1092-93. My argument differs from Calabresi and Melamed's on a number of
grounds. First, while my argument has benelited from some insights of the law and economics
movement, my argument is not offered from that perspective. My work has an historical foundation that is invested in the interpretation of terms considered subjcctive and therefore difficult
to value, such as conscience, and empathy. Second, as Rcndlemnan has observed, distinctions
between "property" and "liability" rules are challenged, for example, when "the defendant can
violate an injunction and convert the plaintiff's irreparable right into a cause of action for compensatory contempt, money. By breach, the defendant has remitted the plaintiff to that inadequate remedy, for it is now too late for the plaintiff to enjoy the substantive right." Doug

Rendleman, Rejectig Properly Rules-LJability Rules for Boomer's Nuidancc Remedy: 77e
Last 7our You Need of Calabresiand Melamned's Cathedrd, at 28 (Washington & Lee Pub.
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2013-02, 2013), available at
http://papcrs.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfiiabstract id-2212384. Further, Rendleman notes that
the distinction between property and liability rules "de-emphasizes real litigants' emotional and
cultural responses to conflict." Id. at 34. My essay is invested in unearthing such responses and
their potential mneanings.
82. Smith, supra note 72, at 4, 8, 17-18, 26.
83. To be sure, the terms of the characterization are mine, as Smith does not adopt similar
language in his cngagement with equity.
84. Id at 18.
85. Id. at 22-23.
86. Id. at 23.
87. For a quick overview of prior appropriation, seeJ. Byron McCormick, he Adequacy
of the Prior Appropiiation Doctnne Today, i WATER RESOURCES ANt) THE LAw 33, 34
(1958). I neither present the articles that follow in chronological order nor do I claimn that they
present themselves as part of the equitable justice argument. However, I argue that their general concerns can be seen to reflect and incorporate those of the equitable justice line of argu-
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lamation that prior appropriation died in 1991 states how the venerable doctrine of prior appropriation finally succumbed to the concerns at the heart of
equitable jus6ce:
Prior has now passed on. He died this january 19th when his heart seized
up afdter receiving a t*ix informing him that, on that very clay, the new Director of the Denver Water Board had recommended that the water developers
not file a lawsuit challenging EPA's rejection of the dam at Two Forks. In
truth, however, he died of multiple causes. The publication of Milagro
Beanliel lu" ("It's lies, lies top to bottoif," Prior would fume. Ramona,
who seldom teased Prior, would say, "It's just fiction, love," and, she would
add with a gleam in her bright eyes, "Oh, but it's a funny book, Prior.").
Carter's Hit List in 1977 ("We need a good conservative Republican trom
the West, preferably California," Prior ranted.). President Reagan's moratorium on federal funding of water projects. The Mono Lake opinion and the
public trust doctrine (Prior raged, "What kind of a court is this? Talking
about brine shrimp, gulls, Wilson's Phalarope, tufa-whatever the hell that is.
'This was supposed to be a case about water."). The serious illness of the
General and the ridicule he is su'ffering just now, in his last days. Indiam water settlements ("They don't deserve a single drop."). Environmentalists-just
the mere existence of them. Academics who relentlessly criticized Prior's
ideas ("The bastards wotldn't know the real world from a beachball."). Federal reserved water rights. State water planning ("We've got a plan. It's
called 'first in time, first in right."'). An especially cruel blow was when they
adoplted an instream flow prograam-in Utah.8
Donald J. Pisani similarly reflects an, equitable justice bent when he argues that
"[einterprise triumphed over equity" in the nineteenth century West when
speculators and monopolists gathered vast water rights under the doctrine of
prior appropriation, beneficial use of the water to which they were entitled often went unchecked, and waste occurred."
Others echo these arguments. David B. Schorr returns to prior appropriation's birth, and responds to many of Pisani's concerns." Schorr argues that
prior appropriation's nineteenth-century inception "expressed a concern for
broad and equitable distribution of resources" that was "radical" in its opposition to monopolies and speculation.' Christine A. Klein exaunines how judiInents.
88.
xvi-xvii
89.
1centih

Charles F. Wilkinson, hi Memoian: PriorAppropriation,1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v,
(1991).
DonaldJ. Pisani, Ente;priseand luity: A Critique of Western Water LaIw hi the NineCentwj; 18 W. HIST. Q. 15, 23, 36-37 (1987); see also MARYBELLE D. ARCHIBALD,
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, AIPROIRIATIVE WATER
RiGIrrs IN CALIFORNIA: BACKGROUND AND IssUEs 48-53 (1977), available at lttp://ww
w.waterboards.ca.gov/)tiblicafioosonirs/pulicafions/gcneral/locs/1597.pdf (noting that the
appropriative doctrine has been criticized for (1) waste through "premature or excessive (evelopment" when (a) water is diverted from more socially advantageous uses so as to generate private rents, (b) there are speculative water applications by municipxditics, (c) there is overinigation; for (2) perverse incentives created by threats of abandonment of water rights iuid by
disuse; for (3) a chronological system of rights ap)ortionment that is agnostic to where the

rightsholders are located on a stream, meaning that overuse upstream can lead to no water
downstream; and (4) because junior appropriators are inequitably affected during shortages).
90. See David B. Schorr, Appropriationas Agra)7alnsn: Di~sriljutiveJusticei1 the Creation
of PropertyRihts, 32 EcotnOcY L.Q. 3, 3 (2005).
91.
i. at 11, 27-28, 32. According to Schorr:
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cial recognition of instream uses struck at the heart of the "myth" of the diversion requirement of prior appropriation, which had been elevated to constitutional status." Michael Toll pursues a "comprehensive" approach to prior appropriation, examining the beneficial use requirement."
Toll's holistic
approach borrows from the riparian doctrine used in eastern states to argue
for a renewable water right permit system within the doctrine of prior appropriation." Reed D. Benson similarly pursues Wilkinson's argument and examines recent jurisprudence from Washington, Idaho, and New Mexico to
note that there is an "ongoing exodus" from prior appropriation as states deviate from core doctrinal principles. 5 For Benson, "[plirior Appropriation has
lost its hold over western water law. " 96
Efficiency concerns arise for other commentators. Janet C. Neuman argues that beneficial use encourages inefficient water use in western states as
"Itlhe prohibitions against waste-even the threat of forfeiture for nonuse-are
mostly hortatory concepts that rarely result in cutbacks in water use."" For

Therefore, rather than seeing Colorado water law as oiginating no farther back
than the mining camps, with tie appropriation docuine springing fully-grown, Athena-like, fron the heads of the miners; viewing it as a spontaneous response to the arid
conditions of the Colorado plains; or describing it as a natural outgrowth of the Spanish and Mexican law formerly in force in the region, it would be more accurate to describe miners' laws, claim club regulations and the appropriation doctrine as part of a
complex of pro-settler and anti-speculator laws and rules prevalent in mid-nineteenth
century America, particularly in the West.
d. at 32. For other views on the history of prior appropriation, see Wells A. Hutchins & Hany
A. Steele, Basic Water Rights Doctrines and Their Ilmphictions for River Basin Development,
22 LAW AND CONrEMP. PROBS. 276, 280-81, 288-89 (1957) (describing prior appropriation as
arising from Roman civil law and local custom, and noting that both ripa-ians and appropriators
can waste water); Edwyna Harris, 77e Evolution of Water Rights in the Ninetecnth Centuly:
7he Role of CljinateandAsset 7ype, 35 NAT. RESOURCE.SJ. 217, 217, 256 (2013) (providing a
predictive franework to argue that climate alone does not account for tie evolution of water
lights systems in the United States and Australia, but also the kind of asset deployment that
made use of the resource).
92. See Christine A. Klein, 7he ConsLitutionalMythology of Western Water Law, 14 VA.
ENvrL. Lj. 343, 367-68 (1995).
93. Michael Toll, Comment, Reinaginhg Western Water Law: Tne-Limited Water Right
'ernits Based on a Comprehensive Beneficial Use Doctane, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 595, 598,
626 n.167 (2011).
94. I. at 626-31; see a/so Joseph W. I)ellapenna, Dual Systems, in I Waters and Water
Rights, § 8.02(b), at 7-8 (Any K. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2015) ("Colorado courts at times have seemed intent on eradicating every conceivable vestige of riparian
rights, yet even Colorado courts have fallen back on riparian language to justify their conclusions that there are a few rights in the owner of the bed of the river and no other rights other
than those held under ant appropriative right."). For more on the riparian doctrine, see Lynda
L. Butler, Allocatiig Consumptive Water Rights in a i?,voann Jurisdicdon:Defining the Relationship Between tAilic and Pivate Interests, 47 U. Prir. L. REV.95 (1985) (arguing that the
liparian systen arose in al agrarian society to privilege water uses by private individuals and
thus needed to be reformed to allow greater use by public entities).
95. Reed D. Benson, Alive But Irrelevant: 7he lJior Appropiation Doctnh'e i 7bday's
Western Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.675, 708 (2012) ("Municipal water lights and doinestic wells are two areas in which stales have long been willing to deviate from [prior appropriation] in order to accommodate other important goals.").
96. Id.at 711.
97. Janet C. Neuman, Beneticial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: 7he Inellicient Search lbr
Jlticiency in Westeri Water Use, 28 EN'vrL. L. 919, 922 (1998). For Neuman, "elficie'ncy"
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Neuman, efficiency might be increased if courts questioned customary water
uses, state agencies applied aid enforced efficiency-enhancing standards, and
legislators strengthened water conservation prograns." A. Dan Tarlock argues that prior appropriation "is often more rhetoric than rule. Like all drastic
rules, the rule's importance lies more in the threat of its application rather
than the application. ' For Tarlock, "lilt is perhaps more accurate to describe
prior appropriation as an extreme default rule of decreasing marginm importance,' and the focus should be on whether prior appropriation protects
"investment-backed expectations from the risks of variable water years and
perhaps now global climate change."" Nicole L. Johnson argues that the current appropriative system lends itself to inefficiencies.'°' Johnson is invested in
the transfer and marketability of instream uses, and she proposes instreani
rights quantification to increase both elliciency and access to instream rights by
private entities.' 2
Other commentators have mounted a defense of prior appropriation.
justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. argues in favor of "IpIriority's continuing role,"
which has come to include many of the concerns at the heart of equitable justice."'0 For justice Hobbs, priority is not dead; it is, instead, "the most misunderstood stick in the water rights bundle .... Justice Hobbs examines recent
jurisprudence from the Colorado Supreme Court to argue that prior appropriation is resilient.' ° Derek L. Turner shows that, while anti-speculation and

mcans "accomplishment of he desired result with a minimum amount of water. This is distinct
from an economist's definition of efficiency." Id. at 922 n.7. Yet, the "economist's definiton"
is implicit in Neuman's analysis of waste when she argues, for example, that "[nmo one should
use water wastefuilly, becatise someone else could probably use that same water productively

Id. at 965. It is also cxplicit in her
anl l)eneicially, thus increaLsing the overall value to societ.
treatment ofimarkets. Id. at 991-95.
98. Sce id. at 978-91.
99. A. l)an Tarlock, PriorApproprluiaon: Rule, Puinciole, or Rhetorici, 76 N.D. L. REV.
881,883 (2000).
100. Id. at 884, 894.
101. Nicole L.johnson, lovperty 14ithout Possession, 24 YALEJ. ON REG. 205,205(2007).
102. Id. Johnson thus only very loosely can be seen to fit into equitable justice insofar as she
is in favor of private instrealn rights. CT Shelley Ross Saxer, 7ihe J'lud Natme oflProertv
JRis il' lVae; 21 DUKE ENv-rL. L. & PoI.'Y F. 49, 50 (2010) (arguing that "water is too unlike
land to be subject to private property holdings"). Saine H. Knudsen similarly argues:
It seems much easier, albeit detrimental, to accept a world with bright line divisions
between "yours" and "mine." Fortunately, tlere are historical examples that shed
light on how a workable relationship between public rights and private ownership can
be achieved. The area of water law and water rights is a good example. Given the
continuous, interconnected characteristics of water, not to mention its importamce to
public welfare, water has never been considered a good candidate for total privatzation. As a result, water has long belonged to the people collectively, even when it
runs underneath or through private property-private owners possess only conditional
rights to use the water resource.

Sanne H. Knudsen, Remedving the Mis,,se of-Nalurc, 2012 UTAH L. RI:v. 141, 165-66 (2012).
103. Gregory J. Hobbs, jr lrioriv: 77ie Most Misunderstood Sick in the Bundle, 32
ENvrI.. L. 37, 42 (2002).
104. Id. at 37.
105. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Reviving the Phlic Owneuuhip, Antispeculation, and Benelicial
Use Moorings olThorAppropdion Water L w, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 104 (2013).
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anti-monopolization are at the basis of Colorado's prior appropriation doctrine, recent jurisprudence from the Colorado Supreme Court has tightened
the burden of proof for municipal water providers to satisfy conditional water
appropriations.'"
Tension thus appears between critics and apologists.' 7 The implications
of this debate are important. Revisions to the prior appropriation doctrine
mean not only that a contested resource like water takes on new values, but
also that readings of state constitutions accommodate and even promulgate
those meanings. Equity, in its various guises, is important in this discussion
because it goes to the heart of the values infonning discussions of water rights.
F. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Prior appropriation and traditional equity are supposed to be abolished or
moribund. My argument shows that both traditional equitable remedies and
prior appropriation are resilient and adaptive. For this, I rely generally oil two
lines of inquiry.
The first is Smith's approach to equitable remedies as a functional tool of
ongoing significance to litigants and courts. As Smith's is a powerful defense
of traditional equity from a law and economics perspective, my argument
adopts the broad strokes of Smith's argument, even though my argument does
not rest on that perspective. As Smith shows, equity's structure, vocabulary,
maxims, and rules still matter. They matter because a discussion of equity involves more than outcome; it also includes process. For me, process matters. ' Process includes history. History helps explain equity's ongoing practi106. See Derck L. Turner, Comment, Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited and An Anti-Speculation 1)octine for a New Era of W'ater Supply l'lalming, 82 U.
CO.O. L. R1v. 639,643-44,677 (2011).
107. I use the terms "critics" and "apologists" more as general guideposts than as taxonomic
certainties. Indeed, elements of each can be found in the other.

108. See generally,Joseph L. Sax, 7he Public 7rust Docrine in Natur-dJesource Law: Efkctive JudicildIntervention,68 MICH.L. REv.471, 558 (1970) ("'Thus, as is usually the wont of
lawyers, die author has attended essentially to problems of process"). For some, my reliance on
process will recall process jurisprudence. Process jurisprudence, whose foremost expositors
were Lon Fuller, Henry Hart, Albert Sachs, Herbert Wechsler,John Hart Ely, and Alexander
Bickel, is:
[Aln attitude about the point and the value of law, about the social role of the lawyer
and the law school, and about the purpose of legal scholarship. It is an attitude premised, in every instance, on the belief that those who respect and exercise the faculty of
reason will be rewarded with the discovery of a priori criteria that gives sense and legitimacy to their legal activities.

Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process 7radition in American Jurispnidence, 15
CARDozo L. REv.601, 605 (1993). Process jurisprudence is normative insofar as it advocates
an ideal vision of die law. Id. at 704. Itrelies upon and seeks to unearth die rational underpinnings ofjudicial discourse through "purposive interpretation of legal rules" as reasoned elaboration of neutral judicial principles is "possibly the fundamentalll legal value." Id. at 624, 627,
679. It believes that "reason fosters accountability and restraint." Id. at 639. Scholars and students must identify whether different judicial org-ans are performing their distinctive task as assigned. "Jurisprudence, in other words, is conceived as quality control." Id. at 636. Outcome
should be subordinated to process, and discretion should succumb to reason. Id.at 665, 686;
see also Laura Kalman, EatingSpaghetti with a Spoon, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1997) (reviewing
NEIL DUXBURY, PATIERNS OF AMERICANJURISPRUDEINCE (1995)). While indebted to process
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cal appeal for litigants and adjudicators,'" and why certain constituencies can
make compelling equitable subjects. History includes tie evolving meaning of
equitable remedies. Meaning is importat in water cases because of the particular values that individuals and commnities attach to a resource like water.
The second line of inquiry on which I rely is the equitable justice line of
arguments, with its holistic approach to resource management. Equitable justice shows that decisions regarding water affect multiple constituencies. These
constituencies include humans as well as flora and fauna, which should have a
say, however indirectly, in the lawmaking processes affecting their survival. As
such, various constituencies are stakeholders in water rights cases. Under the
equitable justice line of inquiry, an equitable remedy involves more than a traditionally equitable result. It. also encompasses, and is responsive to, the
broader needs of the various constituencies implicit in any litigation regarding
water.
My goal is thus to unearth the meanings and appeal of prior appropriation
and e(luitable relief, which is not always explicit in a judicial outcome. As part
of this excavation, I implicitly argue in favor of judicial discretion and its continuing appeal to litigants."' Equitable watchwords like "conscience," equitable
maxims, and their equivalents, persist in water rights cases as they bear particular meaning for litigants and judges. Far from being meaningless or defunct,
therefore, both prior appropriation and traditional equitable relief play a vital
role in western water rights cases.
In part It,I set a historical foundation for ny discussion by exploring in
detail the first prior appropriation cases fron Colorado, New Mexico, and
California. From the appropniation doctrine's inception, plaintiffs have relied
on traditional equitable relief to enforce their claims to water. The injunction
insight that outcomC is not everything, and judicial reasoning is central to
jurisprudence for its
the legal project, I would not subordinate discretion o rcason but would attempt to lind ways of
making themn, at the very least co-equal.
109. Indeed, history mad traditional equity are enjoying a noteworthy, if somewhat controversial, return in recent precedent from the Supreme Court of teiUnited States. &cegenerullv
Bray, suplma note 2, at 4.. My own engagement with equity in the nineteenth century precedes
my reading of Bray's work, but Bray's insight is geriane here. Bray notes that "atevery point,
the Court has suplorted its new equity jurisprudence by appealing to history and tradition," and
it should "not come as a surprise then that the Court is constructing an artificial history of equity. Although the justices range over the whole history of equity, they tend to draw fiom the equily of the middle-to-late nineteenth century mid the early twentieth century." Id. at 4, 27.
110. According to Bray:
Discretion, too, is deeply rooted in the tradition of equily. Much of the literature on equity over the last five hundred years has focused on this characteristic, and
the argunnents arc predictable. Critics, such as John Selden or more recendy Daniel
Farber and John Yoo, have objected that equity is a cloak lor arbitrary judicial policynaking. They see "the chancellor's conscience" as mere personal whim, as varying
as mch froin one chancellor to the next as "the chancellor's flot." In contrast, judgcs granting equitable remedies have traditionally emphasized both the value and the
limits of equitable discretion. As to its value, judges have said that equitable discretion allows them to fashion equitable remedies that are appropriate to the justice of
the particular case, to choose rigor or forlbearance as the case demands. As to limits,
it has long been a commonplace in judicial opinions that ecquitable discretion is
bounded. Even in equity "there are signposts for the traveler."
AcLat 46-47.
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and its equitable equivalents have proven central in this regard.' Injunctive
relief has provided a preventative remedy to many plaintiffs that have alleged
irreparable damage, and it has allowed litigants to anticipate prospective enforcement of their water rights. As such, injunctive relief has facilitated the
appropriative regime's future because the injunction has symbolic meaning in
water rights cases. Injunctive relief serves as a validating tool both of prior appropriation's history mad of its importance for the West. Simultaneously, injunctive issuance has historically undermined the riparian doctrine in all three
states.
Conscience is preeminent. Lawyers often disfavor appeals to conscience.
"Conscience, so the argument goes, 'is too amorphous a concept to be susceptible to analysis by abstraction', and is therefore of no use to a court of law."....
Yet the law protects subjective conscience as "liberty of conscience," for exanple, in the case of conscientious objectors."' A strong legal approach to
conscience might be one in which "the call of conscience sounds as if it is talking to us, because it embodies moral standards with a truth value that is cornpletely impartial."'" In other words, the "'voice of conscience' . . . is an expression of a powerful inclination to abide by what we perceive as our moral
duty, even in the face of consequences contrary to our interests."" In this
paradigm, those bereft of a conscience are subject to "such a fatal Ilaw in
Itheiri moral psychology that [they are] not part of the moral game. '""
"IDloctrines of Equity are there to introduce moral norms to dealings anong
strangers."'
The three foundational cases I highlight imply an evaluation of conscience. That equity acts inpersonam is implicit in these foundational cases
as equitable relief traditionally acts only on the person."' By relying on a nine111. See generally David W. Raack, A Histoiy of lIZunctions in England Before 1700, 61
INI). 1J.539 (1986) (tracing the evolution of injunctive relief from Roman Law to the seventeenth century, and focusing on the oft-contentious relationship between law and equity).
112. hit Samet, What Conscience Can Do Ibr Equity, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 13, 14-15 (2012)
(arguing that the "vociferous opposition to 'conscionability' ... assumes a very specific, and
controversial, concept of conscience" that is highly subjective and discretionary which is better
replaced by a "Kantian objectivist reodel" that "has a strong public aspect as the reasons thai it
quotes to the self apply to all reasonable human beings at all times.").

113. Id.at
114. I. at
115. Al.at
116. Id.at
117.
118.

19.
24 (emphasis in original).

25.

27.
Id.at 13.
See Smith, supra note 72, at 22. According to Smith:

[Elquity originally only acted against the person. Equity courts could order a person
wvithin its geographical jurisdiction to do something and if such person did not, the
court could hold the person in contempt, meaning a line or jail. Originally courts of
equity could not give remedies other than an order to a person, in personam. Injunc-

tions themselves cannot be "in rem": an injunction generally cannot bind all who had
notice of it but rather only those who were specilically named and those acting in
concert with them. Gradually this principle was loosened, for certain categories of
cases and certain trivial ministerial acts that the court could then peronn directly.
For example, now statutes at both the state and federal levels give courts power to
transfer property within the jurisdiction, ith in rei effect, and courts have made
creative use of equitable liens. And in some cases of liens and contractual specific
performance, such short cuts came to be allowed.
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teenth century case that discusses the generalized conscience of a court of equity, I show how the litigants' subjective consciences appeal to tie court's ability to enforce an objective judicial conscience in water rights cases. In so doing, a court can innovate the law while relying on local or other influences in
arriving at a conscientious outcome. As such, the presence of conscience does
not necessarily imply an abuse of discretion, but, instead, that a court will base
its opinion' on generalized criteria of some public importance to a specific ju-

risdiction.

In part III, I move beyond historical foundations and examine in detail
more recent case law from Colorado, New Mexico, and California. Beginning
with Colorado, I show how expansive application of the appropriation doctrine involves tie persistence of the traditional irreparable injury requireNew Mexico and California precedent then show the limitations
ment."
placed upon the appropriative regime, which has had to adapt. In particular,
New Mexico case law shows the continuing importance of traditional equitable
relielr I conclude with California case law, which implies that a substantive
holding can be equitable even if the court does not grant injunctive relief. In
California, equitable justice thus broadens tie meaning of an equitable remedy.
Before concluding, I return to conscience. Conscience can be outcomedeterminative because conscience engages with the morals mad ethics to which
courts and litigants are responsive. Although the three recent water riglts cases I evaluate do not mention conscience, it is, nevertheless, implicit in all of
them. Conscience is an integral part of any grant or denial of equitable relief.
Conscience permeates substantive discussions of doctrines like the public trust
doctrine. Conscience remains a powerful equitable tool, the ongoing importance of which should be underscored.
II. FOUNDATIONAL RELIEF AND PRIOR APPROPRIATION
As one of the most important equitable maxims holds, equity acts in peisonun.'" By acting on the person, equity acts to prevent or stop injustice. As
equitable renedies are discretionary, the plaintill appeals to the court's con-

ic/
119. 1 have followed the exanple of jurisdictions that have statled that "unconscientious" is
preferable to "unconscionable," because the fonier avoids conflation %ith doctrines of unconscionability.

PETER RADAN & CAMERON STEWART, PRINCIPL.ES OF AUSTRALIAN EQuITy AND

TRusTs § 2.5, at 26 (2d ed. 2012).
120. While ny argument proceeds by state, my intention is not to argue that only in Colora(1o does a court deny an injunction in water rights cases and expand the reach of the appropriat-

ive regime; only in New Mexico does a court deny injunctive relief while fivoring a constitutional attack in water rights cases; and only in California does equitable justice prevail. In some
respects, these arguments apply in all three-and other-jurisdictions. Here, these arguments
are predominant and applicable to individual states insofar as my searches for cases responsive
to injunctive relief and/or equitable relief in general prOduced the results with which I engage in
my argument.
121. "In essence the maxims of equity reflect and represent fundamiental moral ideas or
themes that lie at the heart of equitable jurisdiction. The function of a maxim is 'to prox4de
general principles as points of departure, and not to capsule answers to sI)ecitic pNroblemS.'"
RADAN & STEWART, supra note 119, § 2.14, at 28.
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science for a finding of irreparable harm." The court often engages in an intensive factual analysis before issuing its findings at equity. If the court agrees
with the plaintiff, an equitable remedy like injunctive relief issues. Issuing injunctive relief implies a process in which consciences are evaluated and the
injurious ties that bound plaintiff and defendant are often dissolved. Should
the defendant fail to obey the court's command, a finding of contempt may
follow.' 3 Injunctive relief is about one litigant appealing to another's conscience through the legal conscience as intermediaiy.
A. SYMBOLISM IN COLORADO
Injunctive relief was available as early as 1882 in the seminal prior appropriation case, Coflin v. Lefi Hand Ditch Go.'2' Coffin established the water
rights regime that later became known as "The Colorado Doctrine." " In Cof

122.

See Smith, supra note 72, at27-28. This has long been the case:

The use of conscience in equity cases goes back to the Middle Ages. At chancery was kept the sovereign's conscience, and ecclesiastics, who were also confessors,
were the first chancellors. The predominant position among commentators is 'that
Chancery principles were based on, or influenced by, canon law.' As such, chancery
procedure was a legalized form of procedure, based on the Bible. Such a biblicallyinspired approach required rigorous examination of the facts, so that the eror alleged
before the chancellor might te fully appraiscd and understood. As part of such an
examination, the chancellor was often called upon to question the dlefendant and
even obtain a confession.
Duane Rudolph, How Equity and Custon 7ranslbimedAmerican Waste Lauyw, 2 PROP. 1I4. 1,
60 (2015). For appeals to conscience in more recent jurisprudence, see, e.g., Quon v.Stans,
309 F. Supp. 604, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("ITihe request for injunctive relief is directed to die

conscience of the court and within its discretion to grant."); see also Wash. Capitols Basketball
Club, Inc. v. Bany, 304 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 1969) ("The grant or refusal of injunctive relief is a matter of equitable jurisdiction. 43 CJ.S. Injunctions § 12, p. 419. A Court of
Equity will grant the relief when it determines it essential to restrain an act contrary to equity
and good conscience. 43 CJ.S. Injunctions § 1,p).405.").
123. See generallyjohn M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Iess) than "OffSwitches" Patent-hifringement Injuncons'Scope, 90 Trx. L. REV. 1399, 1409 (2012). According to Goldell:
Generally speaking, injunctions are in personam orders that are enforced through
comparatively summary proceedings invoking a court's contempt power. Such proceedings can be criminal or civil in nature. If anr enjoined party is found guilty of
criminal contempt, a court may order determinate sanctions, such as am unconditional fine or jail term, to punish tie contemnor and "vindicatell the court's authority."
Id.
124.

Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 444 (1882).

125. 5ee Sternberger v. Seaton Mountain Electric, Heat & Power Co., 102 P. 168, 169 (Colo. 1909) (distinguishing the Colorado from the California doctrine); Hagerman Irrigation Co.
v. McMurry, 113 P. 823, 825 (N.M. 1911) ("The 'Colorado Doctrine' as it is termled, first appears as a dictum in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Company, 6 Colo. 443, (1882). It declared that,
on the ground of imperative necessity, no settler can claim any right aside from appropriation."); Bailey v. Tintinger, 122 P. 575, 582 (Mont. 1912). In 13ailejy the court stated:
Our Act of 1877, above, specifically recognized the right of an individual to appropriate water to rent or sell to another; but if the Colorado doctrine be invoked here,
such individual could never make his appropriation, for, under the Colorado theory,
the user and not the first individual would be the appropriator, and this is the .only
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tin, an individual who was first to appropriate water from a darn ad divert it
lor the purpose of irrigation sued another who had destroyed part of the darn
to irrigate his own lands during a period of scarcitv.'" The defendant argued
that he had the right to the water under the ripahian doctrine because his lands
lay "along the margin and in the neighborhood" of the water resource. ' The
Colorado Supreme Court rejected the argument as "ungenerous and inequitable."'" The court held that, "in the absence of express statutes to the contrary, the- first appropriator of water from a natural stream for a beneficial purpose has, with the qualifications contained in the constitution, a prior right
'
The court allinned the disthereto, to the extent of such appropriation. "a
tlrict's court issuance of an injunction and award of damages.'"
The prayer for injunctive relief in Co/tin was preventative as "Itihe action
Iwasl brought for damnages arising from the trespass, and lor injunctive relief to
prevent repetitions thereof in the future."' 3 The court was concerned about
the possibility of repeated injury.' 2 As such, the court could not countenance
the defendant's continued reliance on the riparian doctrine, which was "disastrOUS":
In the absence of legislation to the contrary, we dink that tei right to water acquired by piority ol appropiation thereof is not in any way dependent
consistent position to assume, if actual use is a necessary step to a completion of thi
appropriation.
i3;flct4 122 P. at 582. 1 am aware that Yulkcr v. Nichol ;anticipates Collii "discussion of the
appropriative doctrine. See Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 555 (1872) Wells, j., concurring).
However, I locate die beginning of tic appropriative doctrine in Collin because of its explicit
and stronger engagement widi tie doctrine as we recognize it todav. However, as Schorr iargucs:
It is worthwhile noting that while today tei Colorado Doctine of water rights is
generally traced to tie Coffin decision, this was not always so; eariv commentators, as
well as the author of Coffin, tound its earliest expression in Yunker. The issue is not
one of mere pride of place, for on it depends our conception of what the Colorado
)octrine embraces. Thc convention that Collin, decided ten years after Yunker,
marks the beginning of the doctrine, reflects a narrow conception of Colorado water
law, focusing on appropriation. The older (and, it is submitted, soinder) view, rcecognizing Yunker as the foundational decision, gives the variety of rules embraced under the Colorado l)octrine their due, and recognizes that tie primary aim of tie law
was to effect equal access to water resources, to which the earlier decision contributed
by forcing riparian landowners to allow access over their lands to streams.

Schorr, supra note 90, at 58-59.
126. (ollin, 6 Colo. at 444. The plaintiff also sought damages. Id. Nevertheless, for tie
pttrpOsCs of y argument, I foeus on the plaintiff's pnoyer for injunctive relief.

127.
128.
129.

d. at 449.
Id
d. at 447.
Id. at 452.

130.
131.
d. at 444.
132. See gcneillhalns. Co. of N. Am. v. Bonner, 42 P. 681, 683 (Colo. App. 1895) ("There
must be some special circumstances attending a threatened injuy of tis kind, distinguishing it
from a common trespass, and bringing tie case under some recogmized head of equity.jurisdiction before the preventive remedy of injunction can be invoked."); Proper v. Greager, 827 P.2d
591, 597 (Colo. App. 1992) ("Generally, an injunction is a preventive and protective remedy
aimed at future acts. It is not intended to redress past wrongs.").
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upon the locus of its. application to the beneficial use designed. And the disastrous consequences of our adoption of the rule contended for, forbid our
ivina such a construction to the statutes as will concede the sane, if they will
properly bear a more reasonable and equitable one.'"

The plaintiff's request for relief was thus prospective (to avert repeated injury),
anid tie court wanted to avert disaster.
Prospective relief in the case was retrospective in scope. While injunctive

relief in general cannot undo past wrongs, an injunction can help reach into an
injurious past and offer new readings of that past. The Coflin court rebuffed
as "ungenerous and inequitable" the defendant's reading of the statute. 3 ' The
Supreme Court of Colorado "Icouldl not believe that any legislative body
within the territory or state of Colorado ever bilended these Iriparian consequences to flow from a statute enacted.""a The court reasoned that the legislature had anticipated water diversion, and that it could not have anticipated the
diversion without prior appropriation of the water.' The court thus looked
back to impose a remedy going forward. The defendant's arguments against
injunctive relief could not have been right in the past because the court read
prior appropriation into the earliest uses of water in Colorado. The court
lound that prior appropriation "hald] existed from the date of the earliest appropriations of water within the boundaries of the state.' 3. Prior appropriation had always been a doctrine governing water in Colorado.
SCoffin's grant of injunctive relief was also practical and symbolic. As a
practical matter, it penranently inhibited further trespasses against a senior
appropriator's water rights; Symbolically, it enabled the transition between
competing water rights regimes (riparian and prior appropriation). It also located prior appropriation from "the date of the earliest appropriations of water within tie boundaries of the state.'.. The defendant was also wrong on
other grounds. Prior appropriation was foundational to western economic development and to the property rights on which that development depended:
It has always been the policy of the national, as well as the territorial and state
governments, to encourage the diversion and use of water in this country for
agriculture; and vast expenditures of time and money have been made in reclaiming and fertilizing by irrigation portions of our unproductive territory.
Houses have been built, and permanent improvements made; the soil has
been cultivated, and thousands of acres have been rendered immensely valuable, with the understanding that appropriations of water would be protected.
Denv the doctrine of Drioritv or sunenoritv of rieht by tnrioritv of anorovriation, and a great part of the value of all this property is at once destroyed. s

The plaintiff's rights to water by appropriation thus extended to the acquisition

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Coffin, 6 Colo. at 449.
Id.at 449.
Id.at 450.
Id.at 451-52.
Id. at 446.
Id

139. Id.
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of the patent through which he held itle.' ° Indeed, the appropriative doctrine's subsequent sanctity, and its constitutional status in Colorado, had precursors that the court was intent on recognizing."' The injunction that issued
captured these meanings.
B. DEVELOPMENT IN NEW MEXICO

Injunctive relief was also available from the adoption of the appropriative
regime in New Mexico. In the foundational case, 7Tr unbley v. Luiermunm, the
plaintiffs, gristnill owners, sued to enjoin the defendant, a wool and pelt manulacturer, from diverting water fiom the plaintiffs' ditch.''2 The gristmill ownlers and their predecessors-in-interest had used water from the ditch for more
than twenty yeaus, and their use had preceded that of the manufacturer." The
Supreme Court of New Mexico aflirmed the lower court's holding that the
manuf cturer had infringed upon the plaintiffs' water rights, and issued a restraining order.'" The court rejected the defendant's estoppel argument and
held that the plaintiffs' long use had established a prescriptive easement to
which the defendant was subject."' The Supreme Court of New Mexico rejected the riparian doctrine and noted that "common law, as to rights of riparian owners, is not in force in this territory, nor in California, Nevada, and other Pacific states. '"'
That the 7T-,Ynbley court issued a restraining order to enjoin offending
conduct''7 might suggest that the case had little to do with injunctive or equitable relief' New Mexico cases issued around the time of 7Trambley suggest,
however, that a "restraining order" was issued at equity and possessed the attributes of an injunction." Precedent from other jurisdictions around the ime
of the 77;unble' decision also indicates that courts often referred to injunctions and restra'ining orders interchangeably." ' Injunctive relief was thus im-

140.

Id.at448-49.

141. ,Sce gencmllv Tarlock, supra note 99, at 886 ("To tie wcstern irrigation community,
prior appropriation represents a sacred and eternd coven;uit between the federal government
and settlers. It is the reward for enduring the risks and hardships of settling the harsh, arid
West and thus the right to use water is eternal and God-given.").
i
142. Tramblcy v. Lutennan, 27 P. 312, 312 (N.M. 1891).
143. Id.
at312, 315.
144. ld.

145.
146.
147.

Ad.at314-15.
I. at 315.
I. at 314.

148. Keencvt, CanIllo, for example, indicates that a "restraining order" in a water case was
issued "In Chancery" against both plaintiff and defendant so dat they did not impinge upon
each other's water rights. 2 N.M. 480, 490 (1883). In fact, while the Kecncycourtlmentioned a
rcstraining order, counsel had only argued about the propriety of an injiunction, suggesting that
"restraining order" and "injunction" were interchangeable. Id. at 485. Similarly, in Vadis of tlie very essence of
dingham v. Robledo, the Supreme Court of New Mexico noted that, "it
equi,'that a restraining order should be definite and certain in its terms." 28 P. 663, 673 (N.M.
1892) (emphasis added). Further, still odier cases show that New Mexico granted injunctions as
carly as 1857, and the Tramblcy court was, tius, aware of injunctive relief. See Chavez v.
McKnight, I N.M. 147, 149-50 (1857) (granting a "perpetual" iijunction to a wife to "restrain I
and cijoinll the sale of the property"); Munis v. Herrera, I N.M. 362, 364 (1862) (granfing a
"perpetual" injunction to plaintiff, rcstraining tie sale of a horse).
149. See, e.g., Gould v. House, 40 Ind. 403, 404 (1872) ("In connection with this action a
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plicit at the foundation of the appropriative regime in New Mexico.
Injunctive relief in 7rambley mirrored that in Coffin. Both foundational
cases provided preventative equitable relief and established a hierarchy of water users. As in Coffin, injunctive relief in 7Trambley established the boundaries between tie riparian doctrine and prior appropriation. The 7-anbley
court did so in the context of mills, which had been at the heart of riparian
doctrine in the east and the drive for economic development there.' 0 Injuncfive relief in 7)nunbley was also aligned with western industrialization (mills
and manufacture), and concerns about scarcity (the omnipresent watchword
associated with the appropriative regime). Equity thus helped advance the appropriative regime in New Mexico, as it had done in Colorado.
C. BALANCING IN CALIFORNIA

In the foundational case of, Ilrw2 v. Philips, the California Supreme
Court issued injunctive relief. In Irmin, a miner sued another miner for trespass who later arrived on the banks of the stream mad began using the plaintifl's water."' In holding that the equitable maxim quipijorest lempore, potlrestuaining order or temporary injunction was granted to suspend proceedings under the order
of thc common pleas until the further order of the circuit court."); Floyd v. Gilbreath, 27 Ark.
675, 676 (1872) ("The bill was presented to the judge of the Circuit Cour, in vacation, who
granted a temporary restraining order.... IThc injunction was made perpetual and the dcfendant appealed"); State cx rel. Miller v. Lichtenberg, 30 P. 716, 717 (Wash. 1892). The
Lchtenbcg court stated:
It seems to us, however, that under the language of the chapter relating to that subject,
there will be no great violence done to the language used to interpret the words "injunction" ull "restraining order" as substantially synonymous, and that the legislature,
in speaking of iniunctions and restraining orders, meant to use terms which would
make it proper for the court to put its order in the shape of a formal iniunction, as
known to the common law, if it saw fit to do so, and that if it did not see fit to go into
all the formalities required by the use of such a writ, it could accomplish the same
purpose by issuing a simple order restraining the acts complained of.
LichIenbeg, 30 P. at 717; but see Burnett v. Nicholson, 79 N.C. 548, 550 (1878) ("We are not
prepared to say that in a proper case tie defendant may not seek redress for an inqiury done by
such temporary restraining order as well as by an injunction. Both operate in the same way and
produce the same results in a greater or less degree."); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dey, 38 F.
656, 664 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1889) ("The prcliminary injunction will be refused, and the restraining
order will be set aside.").
150. See Carol M. Rose, F'rom -lO to CO,: issons of Water Rights for Carbon 7'iading,
50 ARiz. L. REV. 91, 96 (2008). Rose notes:
Mill developers built dams to power a burgeoning textile industry along the eastern
rivers, particularly in the northeast. Prior to and during the early years of New England's industrial growth, courts and public officials sometimes required mill-builders
to construct fish passages to placate the other major instreamn users, that is, fishing interests, even though these consenation efforts were not successful on the big new
manufacturing dams.

I.
151.

Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145 (1855).

I am aware that Eddy v. Simpson, anticipates

Irwin's discussion of the appropriativc doctrine. See Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 249 (1853).
Nevertheless, I locate the beginning of the appropriative doctrine in hIrin because of its explicit
and stronger engagement with the doctrine as we recognize it today. See Douglas R. Littlefield,

Watcr Rights Duing the Calimarni Gold Rush: Conflicts Over Economic Points of View, 14
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or esture (first in time is first in ight) applied, the Supreme Court of California alirtmed the trial court's finding in the plaintils fiavor. 2 The court reasoned that the common law riparian doctrine was applicable to those who
owned lands along a waterway, but the defendants were only tenants at will,
and "their tenancy [was] of their own creation, their tenements of their oWn
selection, and subsequent, ini point of time to the diversion of the stream. '" '
The land, in fact, belonged to the public. 4 The court favored the "political
and social condition of the country" over which it had jurisdiction to provide a
kind of customary rule enjoying "the force and effect of resjJcticaia.' ". --hat
condition recognized both appropriative rights and miners' rights, but should
a conflict arise, priority trumlped.'"
While the court in h-win did not mention injunctive relief, the plaintifts
complaint had requested it.' In ruling lor the plaintiff, the court prohibited
the defendant's offending actions and thus prevented Further incursions on the
plaintifl's diverted water in his canal. While the court recognized the right of
miners, priority mattered because of the effort and investment of those who
had diverted water, that is:
the rights oflthose who, by prior appropriation, have taken the waters fiom
their natural beds, and by costly artificial works have conducted them for
miles over mountains and ravines, to SUl)ply the necessities of gold diggers,
and without which the most important interests of the mineral region would
remain without developmen't.

The riparian defendant was thus forbidden firther trespass, and the h'wn decision can be read as preventative on the basis of economic development, as
in Colin and 7hriunblev.'
Irwin also displayed an equitable balancing of competing interests reminiscent of courts at equity. Mining and movement of water (along a ripanian
waterway) were at odds in California at the tine. A miners' committee had
heard the Irwin case before the case had gone to court, and the miners' com-

v. Simpson foreshadowed the western doctrine of prior
W. HIST. Q. 415, 427 (1983) ("lMy/
appropriation but did not specifically define it."). Littlefield also notes that the Irw~i plaintiff
was a water salesnam who made quite a profit from diverting watey, id the case can thus be
read as sanctioning "legitimate economic activity distinct Fiom mining." Id. at 431.
5 Cal. at 147.
ri'Wi",
152.
153.
d. at 146.
154. IM.
155. Id.
156. id. at 147.
157. See Ittlefield, sup-ii note 151, at 430. With California's adoption of the comnion law
in 1850, shortly before statehood, it had implicitly established a riparian rights regime in tie
state. I. at 420. The result was that, only a year later, both riparian aid appropriative regimes
co-existed 6th the enactment of a statute recognizing "customs, usages or regulations established and in force at the bar, or diggings." Id.
158. Irwin, 5 Cal. at 147.
1.59. I at 146.
160. See W. Aggregates, Inc. v. Cntv. of Yuba, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 447 (Ct. App. 2002)
("Long before this legal point was resolved or die California lands were surveyed, thousands of
miners had begun work: They were trespassers.") (citing Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal.
279, 374-75 (1859); 1-in, 5 Cal. at 146).
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mittee had favored the riparian "free progress of water" argument espoused by
the defendant miners who had used tie plaintiff's water.' The miners' committee had balked at the fact that the plaintiff, nominally a miner, was in the
habit of selling much-needed water.62' The court in Irwi posed questions
about the riparian defendant's standing to bring suit and it acknowledged the
riparian defendant's right to mnHe (but not to take appropriated water).'" The
right to mine stood "upon an equal footing" with the appropriative right, and
only when they conflicted did priority prevail." ' In fact, if the miner were to
select land adjacent to a waterway whose waters were unappropriated, those
waters "cannot be taken to his prejudice; but if they have been already diverted . .. he has no right to complain, no right to interfere with the prior occupation of his neighbor, and must abide the disadvantages of his own selection."
Thus, the California court applied equity to provide injunctive relief that privileged the appropriative regime while attempting to balance competing interests.
D. THE EQUITABLE CONSCIENCE
Injunctions in the foundational cases show that equity acts on or against
the person. Understanding equity's ability to act on the person in prior appropriation cases goes to the heart of why requests for injunctive relief can
have a subjective dimension that is not always reducible to monetary danages.
Etymology is responsive in this regard, as it not only appeals to the history of a
word, but also helps capture the subjective dimension of a request for equitable relief.'6 "Injunction," after all, can mean to join, yoke, or command.'7
What then, could litigants ask courts to command, yoke, or join at equity in
the foundational prior appropriation cases? What of conscience? None of
the foundational cases mentioned it.
In the three foundational cases, the court started "with a plaintiff in an
imperfect world, one marred by the defendant's violation."'6
Such a world

161.

See Littlefield, supranote 151, at425.

162. Id.
163.

Irwin, 5 Cal. at 145-46. As the court states,

It is certain that at the common law the diversion of water courses could only be
complained of by ripariam owners, who were deprived of the use, or those claiming
directly under them. Can the appellanLs assert their present claim as tenants at will?
To solve this question it must be kept in mind that their tenancy is of their own creation, their tenements of their own selection, and subsequent, in point of time, to the
diversion of the stream. They had the right to mine where they pleased throughout
an extensive region, and they selected the bank of a stream from which the water had
been already turned, for the purpose of supplying the mines at another point.

Id.
164. Id. at 147.
165. Id.
166. See Bray, supra note 2, at 14-18.
167. BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT, MODERN PHILOLOGY: ITs DIscovRiEs, HISTORY AND
INFLUENCE 428 (1877).
168. Rendleman, supra note 20, at 1404. To be sure, Rendleman does not offer this insight
as part of a defense of traditional equity, or conscience, as I do here. Instead, for Rendleman,
ny use of his citation to buttress my argument about traditional equity might well be another
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implied conscience, equity's old watchword. All three courts had noted the
link between onscience and equity. Before Coflfn, tie Supreme Court of
Colorado had referred to "equity and good conscience..'' Before 7]iunbley,
the Supreme Court of New Mexico had Inentioned "mortification which this
court feels in seeing a party with hands thus stained entering a court of equity
and asking that relief which none but those having a pure heart and a clear
conscience have a right to demand."'.. In California, but a year before 1mm,
tie state supreme court had referred to "tie conscience and equity of tie
court ..... The courts were thus aware of conscience's place in a discussion of
equity, and the fact that they did not mention conscience in the three loundational cases does not mean that conscience was not implicit in their grants of
equitable relief. The very idea of a conscience may imply its tacit but influential effect on tie outcome of a case.
Two consciences were at odds in tie foundational cases. The plaintiff's
conscience, originally at ease in its appropriative engagement with water, met
the defendant's (lack of) conscience, and, marred thereby, the plaintiff sounded its claim in equity because, while the law could act on a thing-that is, Jh
rem-equity could act on the person. Both parties then appeared before what
the Supreme Court of California would refer to just two years after 1l-n as
"the conscience of a Court of Equity.'.. That judicial conscience, grounding
itself in an impartial and generalized conscience, evaluated the consciences before it. One litigant was found "ungenerous and inequitable" (Coflin), "untenable" (7)-iunblej, or simply subordinate to the other (Irwaq), and equitable
7
relief issued to the more conscientious litigant in the. way of injunctive relie.'
A ninteenth-century faminly law case from California, issued around the
time of the three foundational water cases, underscores conscience's centrality
to evocations of equity. In Galland v. Gadland, a woman driven fromh her
spousal home with her infant child, "wholly without the means of support,"
sued for alimony without asking for a divorce.' 4 InI such circumstances, the
law allowed her to purchase on her husband's credit. " But, the court Ciuestioned, was this "the only remedy for a deserted and dependent wife, who either haidi no subsisting cause for divorce, or who, having just grounds for dissolving the marriage, hopeldi for a refornation in her husband, and therefore
Ididi not desire a divorce? '"' The statute only provided for alimony after divorce had been granted and for divorce if the wife had been abandoned for
1

example of tie "romaice" of equity with its "warn andl fuzzy connotations of individualized
justice," with which he does not agree. See Doug Rendleman, IrTcpanahilht Irep;uallV Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1642, 1653 (1992) (reviewing I)OUGLAs LxYCOCK, THE DEArH OF THE
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991)). I cite Rendleman here, therefore, as part of my own argument of the continuing viability of traditionad equity, whose languagc and principles infuse
and shape de arguments of even its detractors.
169. Clear Creek, Colo., Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Root, 1 Colo. 374,375 (1871).
170. Martinez v. Lucero, I N.M. 208, 214 (1857).
171. People ex rel. Smith v. Olds, 3 Cal. 167, 177 (1853).
172. Kinder v. Macy, 7 Cal. 206, 208 (1857).
173. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449 (1882); Trambley v. Luternmn 27 P.
312, 315 (N.M. 1891); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855).

174. Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265, 266, 268 (1869).
175. Id.at 266.
176. Id.
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two years.'" "[Was] the law so deplorably deficient as to afford no remedy to
a deserted and starving wife under these circumstances? If so, it [wasi a reproach to the civilization of the age, and the law-making power should
promptly correct the evil.".. 8
Only equity could provide relief.' 9 The husband had moral responsibilities to his wife and child, and equity was well-placed to compel him to act in a
conscientious manner:
It is clear that strong moral obligations must lie on any husband, who has
abandoned his wife, to support her. The marriage contract, and every prin-

ciple, hind him to this. To fail to do it, is a wrong acknowledged at common
law-though that law knows no remedy, because there the wife cannot sue the
husband. But in equity, the wife can sue the husband; and it is the province

of a Court of Equity to afford a remedy where conscience and law
acknowledve a right. but know no remedv. Why, then, should the Chancellor shrink at this case and refuse a remedy? 8
Conscience acted as a moral corrective and imperative. As a corrective, it rectified a delicit in the law that was disadvantageous to women. As an imperafive, it commanded the husband to act in a manner consistent with his "strong
moral obligations." Conscience operated "independently of the statute," and
free of the husband's claims that would subordinate his wife and child to his
refusal.'"' An equitable morality could thus be read into a contract to reaffirm
the husband's marital obligations.
Whose conscience did the Galland court apply, and was it generalized
and impartial? It likely was not the legislature's conscience since the statute
did not provide a remedy for the wife and child tinder the circumstances.' 2 It
likely was not a conscience reflecting generalized public morals given the husband's argument that holding against him would "tend to breed discord in
families, and to encourage discontented wives to abandon their husbands on
frivolous pretexts of ill-usage, relying on the Courts to compel the husbands to
support thei ."''
In other words, the fact that the husband could make such
an argument to the state's highest court implied that he anticipated-and received-an approving response, even among some judges on the Supreme
Court of California.' 4

177. Id.at 267.
178. Id.
179. Id.at 268.
180. Id. at 268-69 (quoting Butler v. Butler, 14 Ky. 201, 204-05 (1823)).
181. Id. at 268 (quoting Butler, 14 Ky. at 203-04).
182. Indeed, a legislature may act against the generalized morality of its constituents. In
1810 Congress "decreed that the nation's post offices must remain open on Sundays." WAYNE
E. FULLER, MORAIxIY AND THE MAIL IN NINETEENTH-CEN'TURY AMERICA 1 (2003). "ITIhe
passage of a measure [wasl so repugnant to so many Americans." Id. at 4. "To evangelicals,
Ithe law] was a monstrous act that they felt compelled to oppose with all their being." Id. at 10.
183. Galland, 38 Cal. at 272.
184. According to the dissent:
It is clearly the duty and common law obligation of the husband to provide a suitable
maintenance for his wife, if %ithin his power, during the existence of the marriage relation. Yet, Courts of Equity have no original jurisdiction to enforce specific perfor-
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How then did the Supreme Court of California hold that the stronger, and
thus more conscientious argument was "that if such redress be denied to tie
wife in proper cases, dissolute and unprincipled husbands would be encouraged to abuse their wives, by a consciousness that any ill-treatlment which
stopped short of a lawful ground for divorce, was without redress in tie
Courts."'' The court relied on extra-statutory values and, in so doing, validated morals other than those held by unconscientious husbands. The court
turned to a kind of transcendent morality that trumped legislative inaction on
women's behall, which trumped, too, the arguments of abusive husbands.
GalanCI surmounted jurisdictional limitations to join itself to the holdings of
other courts at equity so as to stay an immoral result in California. The court
in Galland relied on Kentucky precedent at length, and it also noted that
"Itihe power of a Court of Equity to decree alimony, where no other relief was
asked has been upheld, in well-considered cases, by the Supreme Courts of
Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina and Alabama."'.
Conscience was thus something beyond the subjective passions of all individual
justice, as it was rellected in the considered opinions of other judges at equity.
By appealing to a trans-jurisdictional conscience, Galand affirmed conscience's potential outcome-determinative importance for individual litigants.
The case also implicity anticipated a change in public morals in California

fanily natters.'7 The court in Galland also implied that a court of equity was
a court of outrage."' After all, was "the law so deplorably deficient as to afford
mance of this obligation. "'Tihe proper remledy," says Mr..justice Story, "whci the
husband abandons the wifc, or drives her from his house, aud neglects or refuses to
provide her suitable maintenance, is, bv an action in a Court of law, to be brought
against the husband by any person who shall, under such circumstances, supph' the
wife with necessaries according to her rank and condition; for, by compelling the wife
thus to leave him, die husband sends her abroad with a gencral credit for her maintenance." (2 Story's Fl..ur. See. 1422.) And I apprehend this is the only remedy
against the husband for the maintenance of ie wife, in this State, prior to the commencnement of an action for divorce by either husband or wife, tpon allegation of
statlilory Cause.

IM. at 278 (Sprague, j., dissenting).
185. Id. at 272 (majority opinion).
186, Id.
at 268.
187. Itmight be tempting to read Galldas a trailblazer, and, on this basis sumnise that
women's rights were subject to greater judicial sensitivity after it. Gallandwas decided in 1869,
the year that the National Woman Suffrage Association was founded in New York City, yet
women would only get the vote in 1920. But see PETER CHARLE'-S HOFFER, THE
I
\w's
CONSCIENCE: EQurFAIBts. CONSTrJLTriONALISM IN AMERICA 4 (1990). According to Hoffer:
Iirom Iv. Board otvducalionl was and remains the greatest 'equity' suit in our country's history, perhaps in tie history of equity. Though fully blended into the lahric of
Modern law, equity suits and equitable relief remain distinct in their cast-the chancellor is vitally concerned with the workability mid flairness
of his decrees.

Id.
188. ,See Cass R.Sunsicin, Some EI1tis olMojal Jndgation 01)

L7llw,

33 VT. L. REV. 405,

405 (2009). Sunstein provides an exanple:
As we shall see, indignation is responsible for a number of puzzling practices in politics and law. Recurring thehies are that people's moral judgments are often aUtOmiatic, that their attonatic responses play a significmuit role in both legislatures and in
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no remedy to a deserted and starving wife under these circumstances? If so, it
[wasl a reproach to the civilization of the age, and the law-making power
should promptly correct the evil." 8 In some sense, too, Galmd either institutionalized or referred to an institutionalized conscience at equity." Where an
individual litigant's conduct was aberrant and the statute was "deplorably deficient" in its response, enter equity to reach across state boundaries to provide
a remedy. As the Ga/landmajority put it, "Iwihy, then, should the Chancellor
shrink at this case and refuse a remedy?"'
How, therefore, might Galland's insights apply to the three foundational
water cases? Each foundational court valued the plaintiffs individual investment in water and elevated the plaintitfs investment in the resource to level of
a public good. Whether that individual had erected a dam (CoItin), founded

a gristmill (Trxnb/ey, or mined (Iw), the court made it worthy of legal protection. In some sense, it was as if each plaintiff had innovated by being the
i'st to harness the resource, and, as the first, had embarked upon an entrepreneurial undertaking on which the institution of property depended. As the
court in Coffin noted, "Idleny the doctrine of priority or superiority of right by
priority of appropriation, mad a great part of the value of all this property is at
once destroyed.' As Ihwi, noted, innovators warranted equitable protection
because they had "taken the waters from their natural beds, and by costly artificial works have conducted them for miles over mountains and ravines ...
without which the most important interests of the mineral region would remain without development.' 4 The Coftin court would similarly note that
"Ihiouses have been built, and permanent improvements made; the soil has
been cultivated, mad thousands of acres have been rendered immensely valuable, with the understanding that appropriations of water would be protected."' And 7-ambleywas about manuflacturing. The plaintiffs in these foundational cases had been the first to conduct themselves consistently with
public needs, and, thus, conscientiously."
courtrooms, and that it is often valuable but difficult to attenpt to constrain automatic
rcsponses by reference to more deliberative processes.

Id.
189.

Ga/land, 38 Cal., at 267.

190. 1am grateful to Elizabeth Sepper's article, Taking C'onsciece Seiously, for drawing my
attention to institutional consciences in die medical arena, which can be in conflict with those of
the individuals who work there. See-Elizabeth Sepper, Takihg Conscience Scriously, 98 VA. L.
REV 1501, 1509 (2012). Sepper exposes the probing ethical and legal questions that arise when

consciences clash. She notes, in this regard, that legislatures across the country have enacted
"conscience clauses-to protect refusing providers from discrimnination in hiring, stall
privilegcs,
or promotion; professional discipline; civil actions (typically malpractice); and regulatory or

d. While Sepper does not mention equity or discuss equitable remedies,
her discussion is germane, as it shows the wide-and often disturbing-contours of a discussion
criminal sanctions."
of conscience.
191.

Gallan, 38 Cal. at 269 (quoting Butler v. Butler, 14 Ky. 201, 205 (1823)).

192. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882).
193. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855).
194.

Co/in, 6 Colo. at 446.

195. First possession is also implicit in the related property doctrines dealing with original
acquisition: accession, adverse possession, creation, and discovery. See THOMAS W. MERRILL

&HENRY E. SMITH,THE OXFORD INTRODUCriONS TO U.S. LAWv: PROPERTY 18 (2010). Mer-ill
and Smith explain first possession as follows:

ISStle
2

WHYPIOR APPROPRIA 770N NEIgS EQUITY

And yet, in the three jurisdictions, the conscience on which the three
Foundational cases relied was neither tras-jurisdictional, nor did it anticipate a
change in local morals. Conscience relied on conditions prevailing in each
jurisdiction, making it localized. Collin relied in part on local agricultural necessity, which made prior appropriation an "imperative necessity,"" 7Thmblev
relied on local laws,"' and hmln on the "political and social condition of the
country."'" Conscience was thus localized, not within the proverbial judge's
foot, but within the jurisdiction in which the court sat.
III. BEYOND FOUNDATIONS
Injunctive relief and its equivalents remain powerful remedies 130 years
alter Cbllin. Equity, in these cases, ranges in meaning from its traditional remedial understanding to equally complex iterations of equitable justice. Conscience remains preeminent.
A. COLORADO: EQUIY WITHOUT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The appropriative regime and the irreparable injury rule thrive in Colorado. In Archuleta v. Gomez, an individual appealed the trial court's denial of
his request for preliminary injunctive relief.'0 The plaintiff wished to stop an
individual who had plowed under the plaintifi's ditch, diverted his water, and
claimed adverse possession of his water rights.2" For the plaintiff, adverse possession of water rights in Colorado incorporated the beneficial use requirement implicit in all appropriative uses."°' The Colorado Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff had to show that he had suffered an injury for injunctive relief
to issue."' The defendant would also have to show that he had put the water
to beneficial use for the eighteen-year statutory period since his interception of
the plaintiff's water through a "sealed-off pipe" and "a by-pass device" was, by

The most general mode of original acuisition is first possession. Possession...
Iwhichi is a ubiquitous concept in l)ropertv, with dilerent shades of meaning depend-

ing on context. Generallv speaking, to possess some thing means to be in control of
it. Control implies intention. One does not generally control sonie thing one does
not know one has, or one is trving to throw away. Control also implies power. To

possess some thing is to have Power or dlominion over it. The basic idea of first posperson to possess un otherwise uinowned obiect becomes tihe
session is that the first
owner. This means, generallv spealng, that the first person who both intends to assert control over die obiect and who establishes a si.niticamt degree of power over the
object is deemed to be the owner-provided no one else has any claim of ownership

to it.
d.
f96. Coffin, 6 Colo. at 449.
197. Trambley v. ILterman, 27 P. 312, 314 (N.M. 1891).
198. hin,5 Cal. at 140.
199. Archuleta v. Gomez, 200 P.3d 333, 336-37 (Colo. 2009).
at 338-39.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 336-37; see also ic.at 336 n. I (stating one of tie issues for review as "whether the
trial court erred in finding the requirements of tde 18-year statute of limitations and adverse
possession statute had been met, where there was no evidence the de endant made actual, contiruotis, and exclusive use of all of the plaintiff's water").

202.

1d.at 346.
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itself, insufficient to establish adverse possession."'
Injunctive relief appeared in the context of the expansion of the appropriative doctrine since Archuleta read prior appropriation's beneficial use requirement into adverse possession of water. Over the dissent's objection that
beneficial use was "not directly raised at trial" and had "not previously been
articulated in our adverse possession law," Archuleta implicitly equated the
initial acquisition of water rights through prior appropriation with its hostile
acquisition through adverse possession."' Both are now recumbent on beneficial use. Before Archuleta, 'the elements for adverse possession of a water
right were the same as other real property rights: actual, adverse, hostile, and
under a claim of right, as well as open, notorious, exclusive, mad continuous
for the eighteen-year statutory period."" After the court's decision, however,
"Icilaimants now have the additional burden of showing both a diversion of a
water right owned by another, and application of that water to their acreage in
an amount not exceeding the requirements for crop production (or whatever
the beneficial use may be).""6
Archuleta enforced a basic equitable requirement. It was not enough that
the plaintiff claim that the defendant had ploughed up his water ditches and
had used devices to intercept his water rights. ' The plaintiff had to show that
he had continued to make actual beneficial use of his appropriated water for
the statutory period. As such, the injunctions thus acts as a gatekeeper both of
plaintiff rights and of the sanctity of the prior appropriation doctrine. It evaluates both the conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff must
establish that there is a wrong. A breach of conscience is only implicit when
the plaintiff can show that he has maintained possession of the thing, the res,
as a result of which he prays for a court's in personain intercession.
B. NEW MEXICO: PROCESS, NOT OUTCOME
If Archuleta can be read as reinforcing the vitality of the appropriative
doctrine, recent New Mexico precedent can be read to show its limitations.
New Mexico precedent goes to the heart of the constitutional battles waged in
203. 1(1. at 337, 839.
204. Id. at 349-50 (Martinez, J., dissenting). justice Martinez took issue with the majority's
pronouncement:

I agree with the logic that, because new appropriations remuire benelicial use, an
adverse possessor of water lights should also show beneficial use. However, this clement is not statutorily rcquired and has never before been articulated by a court in

this state. Tbe maiority states the beneficial use requirement as if it has alwavs been
part of adverse possession law. This re(tuircment may be a logical addition to the clements of adverse possession of a water right; however, it is a new Proposition. I believe that, given the small amount of water in question, the anount of time this litigation has alreadv taken, and the issues at stake, this is an inappropriate case in which to
announce a new legal requirement.

A.
205. D. Austin Rueschhoff, Case Note, Archuleta v. Gomez: Re iforcing the Requirement
ofBeneficial Use of l'Vater inColorado Adverse Possession LaI, 16 U. DENV.WATER L. REV.
431,431,442 (2013).
206. Id.at 442.
207. Archuleta, 200 P.3d. at 337, 339.
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the name of prior appropriation, as aggrieved plaintiffs seek equitable relief
and the upholding of core constitutional principles governing water. As such,
New Mexico's jurisprudence dramnatizes the tension between, on the one
hand, a holding that could be read to undermine the appropriative regime,
and on the other, judicial rhetoric that could be read to uphold it. Yet, the
same precedent could simply be read to mean that prior appropriation is not
an all-encompassing regime touching all water; it only governs so much of it.
The doctrine thrives as it adapts to the limitations courts' readings imposed
upon it.

New Mexico's precedent shows how plaintilts seek more than injunctive
relief to validate their water rights. In Bomds v. State ex rel. D'Anionio, a
rancher and farmer with a senior adjudicated irrigation right, in a fullyappropriated basin, made a facial constitutional attack on the domestic well
statute that "requires the State Engineer to issue domestic well permits without
determining the availability of unappropriated water. ''21' Such wells were considered exempt. 20 As the statute did not mandate the issuance of notice and
permits for domestic wells, the plaintiff cried violation of the constitutional
doctrine of prior appropriation and of due process.21 The trial court held that
the statute violated the prior appropriation doctrine. "' Even if the plaintiff had
not shown injury, the trial court held that the statute was unconstitutional, because "lilt is not what has been done, but what can be done under a statute
that determines constitutionality.".... The court further held that the plaintiff:
had failed to show that he was entitled to an injunction or that he had suffered
a taking."
The appellate court reversed the determination of unconstitutionality and
held that the well statute did not violate the doctrine of prior appropriation.2, .
The appellate court declared that, "Itihe Constitution's priority doctrine estabThe Supreme Court of
lishes a broad priority principle, nothing more .....
2
New Mexico engaged in extensive statutory and regulatory analysis and at

208. See Hobbis, sttpfa note 103, a 55.
209. Bounds v. Statc cv rel. D'Antonio, 306 P.3d 457, 459-60 (N.M. 2013). As Richardson
andi Dowell note:
Importantly, current New Mexico law allows a prior appropriator whose right of'
use is harmed by a domestic well to request a priority call or to seek an injuiction in
order to protect his or her rights (See, e.g., State of New Mexico v. Lewis 2006).
Thus, the 'exemption' grantcd to domestic and stock well users is an exemption trom
the permitting process normally required for drilling a well, not an exemption from
the application of the doctrine of prior appropriation.
Jesse J. Richarclson, Jr. & Tiffany Dowell, The Implications ofl3ounds v. State of New Mexico,
148J. OF CONFTEMP. WATER Rts.s. & EDUC. 17, 19 (2012).
210. 1d. at 18 ("Note that the tenn 'exempt well' is an oxymoron in several respects. First,
no state totally exempts a ground water use from regulation. Secondly, the well itself is not the
target of the relaxed requirements. The regulations affdcct the activity of withdrawing water.").
211. Id.at 20.
d.
212.
213. Bounds v. State, No. CV-2006-166, slip op. at 3 (N.M. 6th Dist. Ct. July 8, 2008).

214. 1l at 5-6.
215.
216.

Bounds v. State, 252 P.3d 708, 722 (N.M. Ci. App. 2010).
d. at 719. Bounds abandoned his due process claims. Id at 711.
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finned, but it rejected the appellate court's declaration regarding prior appropriation, which had inflamed water passions in New Mexico."' Given these
facts, it is unsurprising that Bounds "has attracted the attention of a diverse set
of stakeholders from across the United States and internationally."" 8
The analysis of Bounds should begin with the trial court's denial of injunctive relief. After all, the trial court had found that, as matter of constitutional
law, it was not the damage that had been done, but the damage that could be
done that mattered under New Mexico law:
Bounds does not have to suffer actual impairment to attack the constitutionality of the statute. It will do little good for Bounds, and others similarly situated, to sit idly and wait for actual impairment. When the water is gone it
will be too late. Any litigation then will result in claims of laches, waiver,
statute of limitation, estoppel and the like." 9
The trial court's argument was speculative. To prevent the possibility of fitture damage, the well statute had to be declared unconstitutional. In other
words, the plaintiff" had suffered no injury yet still retained standing, and the
case remained ripe for detemrination."
In response to the lower courts, the Supreme Court of New Mexico both
offered muscular rhetoric in favor of prior appropriation, and declined to extend the doctrine's constitutional reach. In response to the appellate court,
the supreme court noted that the appellate court was wrong about prior appropriation:
We do take issue with the Court of Appeals' opinion in certain of its observations regarding the priority doctrine. For example, its conclusion that
'[tlhe Constitution's priority doctrine establishes a broad priority principle,
nothing more' simply goes too far. One could read that statement to mean
that priority water rights are nothing more than an aspiration, subject to legislative whim and administrative discretion. Such a reading would be wrong,
and it would be a mistake for future litigants to cite the Court of Appeals
opinion for any such proposition'

217. Bounds v. State exrel. D'Antonio, 306 P.3d 457, 468-69 (N.M. 2013).
218. Richardson & Dowell, supna note 209, at 17.
219. 13ounds, No. CV-2006-166, slip op. at3.
220. Wishing to reach the constitutional issue, the appellate and supremc courts sidestepped
the standing issues. As the Supreme Court of New Mexico, noted:
[TIhere can be no constitutional challenge to the statute without at least a specific probability of impairment in a given case. The constitutional principles of prior
appropriation are not in peril when senior water users cannot demonstrate a concrete
risk of impairment-that they are in danger of losing the very water guaranteed them
by that same prior appropiation doctrine.
Under our precedent, we could decline to reach the merits of this case. That
said, however, we exercise our discretion to decide these important issues....

In the present case, it would make little sense to disiniss Petitioners' claims be-

cause the issues would remain. We would merely be forcing these parties or others
to litigate the same issues from the beginning, but in an as-applied challenge, all the

while the legal questions regauding the constitutionality of the DWS statute would
remain.
Bounds, 306 P.3d at 463; see also Bounds, 252 P.3d at 711.
221. Bounds, 306 P.3d at468-69.
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The Supreme Court of New Mexico's holding that the statute did not violate
prior appropiiation would thus appear to validate Tarlock's observation that
prior appropriation is "more often" the stulf of "rhetoric than rule."' 2 Indeed,
it may be that "Ipirior Appropriation has lost its hold over western water
law" ... And yet, Bounds could simply be read to realfimi the importance of
the appropriative regime while delimiting the doctrine's boundaries.
C. CALIFORNIA: EQUITY, SHRIMP, AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

California's jurisprudence goes further, and shows that a substantive claim
can be equitable in its validation of broad environmental concerns. Take, for
examnple, the impressive National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine Countvopinion.2' There, an environmental organization sought a writ of
mandate to order the trial court to vacate its grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power ("DWP").
The trial court had held in favor of DWP in a suit to enjoin DWP from (iverting water from Mono Lake to make hydroelectric power for the City of
Los Angeles "on the theory that the shores, bed and waters of Mono Lake are
protected by a public trust. 2 ' As the Supreme Court of California noted, the
case brought both prior appropriation and the public trust doctrine before the
court. 22 The court issued the writ of mandate.
In a delicate balancing act
reminiscent of California's hybrid approach to water law, the court held that
the public trust doctrine neither was subsumed by prior appropriation, nor did
it function independently of it.2' Echoing the foundational prior appropria222. Sec Tarlock, sup7 note 99, at 883.
223. See Benson, suiif note 95, at 711.
224. Nat'l Audubon Soc'v v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 709 (Cd. 1983).
225. Id. at 711-12.
226. Id. at 712. The trial couri also held in favor of DWP on the question of exhaustion of
alininistralive renedies before the Caifornia Water Resources Board. Id. at 711 -12.
227. The court stated:
This case brings together for the first tine two systems of legal thoughlt: the appropriafive water rights system which since the days of the gold rush has dominated Cdifornia water law, and the public trustldoctrine which, after evolving as a shield for the
protection of tidelands, now extends its protective scope to navigable lakes.

d. at 712.
228. d. at 732-33 ("Iet a pcremplory writ of mandate issue commnmding the Superior
Court of Alpine County to vacate its judgment in this action and to enter a new judgment consistent with the views stated in this opinion."). As Laycock stated:
On the other side of the traditional e(tuation, courts can grant personal communands at
law imdenforce them with the contempt power; mandlamus is al exampile. Some
specific relief requires a personal command to le effective, but whether we call such a
conliand legal or equitable-mandamus or injunction-is a matter of history aid doctrine, not a matter of function.
LIvcock, sutn7 note 60, at 697.
229. Nal7Audubon SocVI 658 P.2d at 732. Tle court stated:
The ptublic trust doctrine mid the apt)ropriative water rights system arc parts of an integrated system of water law. The public trust doctrine serves the function in that integrated system of preserving the continuing sovereign power of the state to protect
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tion cases, the court reasoned that appropriation was at the heart of economic
development, and "it would be disingenuous to hold that such appropriations
are and have always been improper to the extent that they harm public trust
uses, and can be justified only upon theories of reliance or estoppel." 5 An
injunction did not issue, but the plaintiff's broader argument regarding the
centrality of the public trust doctrine was vindicated.
Such vindication followed intensive fact recitation characteristic of courts
at equity. The opinion opened with a description of Mono Lake, and of the
wildlife for which it provides sanctuary."3 Then followed mention of how
there was "little doubt" that DWP's diversions "imperiled" "both the scenic
beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake. ' DWP's diversions resulted
in drastic increases in salinity.' Shrimp and migratory birds would sufler significant reductions in population."2 The California gull had become easy prey
for coyotes. 2- Human economic and recreational interests would also suffer,
simply because "there [wouldi be less lake to use and enjoy."2 ' DWP's "continued diversions threaten to turn it into a desert wasteland like the dry bed of
Owens Lake."2
Immediately following this description was the phrase that
predicted the court's holding and that implied that an irreparable injury had
already occurred: "To abate tins destvction, plaintiffs filed suit for injunctive
and declaratory relief in the Superior Court for Mono County on May 21,
1979. 128
The opinion was about the public trust, which had a long and illustrious
history. " There was Justinian on the origins of the public, trust doctrine, then
the English common law, and then its Californian progeny.2' The public trust
public trust uses, a power which precludes anone from acquiring a vested right to
hann the public trust, and imposes a continuing duty on the state to take such uses into account in allocating water resources.

Id.
230. Id. at 728.
231. Id. at 711. 1 only present a sampling of undisputed facts
here. Indeed, it can be difficult to separate the court's findings of fact from the plaintiffs' allegations of fact, as they often
flow into each other. For example, on page 715, the court begins with the plaintiffs' allegations
in one paragraph: "Plaintiffs predict that the lake's steadily increasing salinity, if unchecked, will
wreck havoc throughout the local food chain." Id. at 715. In the next paragraph the court can
be read either as continuing the plaintiffs' allegations or as inteliecting the court's approval of
the plaintils' allegations: "DWP's diversions also present several threats to the millions of local
and migratory birds using the lake." Id.
232. Ild. at 711.
233. Id. at 715.
234. Ild.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 716.
237. Id.
238. Id.(emphasis added).
239. See Takacs, supra note 14, at 711-12. National Audubon cites to Sax, and is influenced by him even in tone. Sce NatlAudubon Soc),,658 P.2d at 719 n.16; compare Sax, supra note 108, at 492 ("Mount Greylock, about which the controversy centered, is the highest
summit of an isolated range which is surrounded by lands of considerably lower elevation."),
with Nat'lAudubon Sock; 658 P.2d at 711 ("Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California,
sits at the base of the Sierra Nevada escarpment near the eastern entrance to Yosemite National
Park.").
240. Id.at 718-19; but see Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Propertyand Soi-
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doctrine was "an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's
common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering
that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right
Even the compelling history of
is consistent with the purposes of the trust .....
of
the
appropriative regime in the
genesis
their
and
early
miners
California's
state (lid not evoke such powerful rhetoric from the Court. True, the Court
did note that "lals a matter of practical necessity the state may have to approve
appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses."'. Nevertheless,
the state had to honor its duty to the public trust. " '
Equity in NaionalAudubonwas about more than the plaintiff's prayer for
injunctive relief. Nationad Audubon, "Itihe biggest coup for environmental' ' "
protection based on California's public trust doctrine in the last fifty years, 2
.was about the stakeholder interests implicit in the court's discussion of a depleted resource. First, the environmental organization could bring suit without
exhausting its administrative remedies. "' Second, species at Mono Lake were

Questioningthe Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 63 1,.
631 (1986). Lazarus opens his article with the following:
creigntv in NaturalResowces:

With thle public trust doctrine], the Califoinia Supreme Court appears enthusiastically to have embraced a new legal Renaissance, in which modern "humanists" rediscover old texts and invoke the distant past to liberate the spirit from the confining "shackles" of a more conventional era. But we are not witnessing Petrarch, mildly
unorthodox in reviving Cicero, or Boccaccio retelling irreverent stories borrowed
fiom Ovid. Here, the half-firgotten ancient models are the codes of the Emperor
Justinian and Alonso die Wise of Castille, the Magna Carta wrested from King John
and-the Treatise of Henn, de Bracton. \Ve may question whether such a revolution,
not in literature or philosophy, but in the law of property, even on the claim of returning to an earlier wisdom, is equally to be applauded.
Id. (quoting Brief of the United States as Aricus Curiae, Summa Corp. v. California ex rel.
State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984) (No. 82-708)); see generally Charles F. Wilkinson,
The Ptddic Trust Doctrinein PublicLand Law, 14 U.C. DAvIs L. Ri.;v. 269 (1980).
241. Nat'!Audubon Soc'v, 658 P.2d at 724. However, Laarus argues that the public trust
doctrine "rests on legal fictions," and is "superfluous and, at worst, distracting and theoretically
inconsistent with new notions of property and sovereignty developing in the current reworking
of natural resources law." ILaanis, .supia note 240, at 656, 658. For Lazaius, standing requirements, modern nuisance law, the state's police power, administrative law, and governmental environmental protection make the public trust doctrine irrelevant. Id.at 658, 664-91. Further reliance on the doctrine "ultimately threatens to impede environmental protection and
resource conservation goals and possibly render Pyrrhic earlier advances." d. at 692.
242. Nat'lAudubon Sotv, 6,58 P.2d at 728.
243. Id.
244. Jordan Browning, Unearthing Subterrawean Water Rights: The EniironimentalLaw
Foundation s Etfor t to Extend Cahfoia'sPublic 7ust Doctine, 34 ENVIRONs 231, 236-37
(2011)..
245. Nat'|Audubon Soc'v, 658 P.2d at 732. As the court stated:
The federal court's second question asked whether plaintiffs must exhaust an adininistrative remedy before filing suit. Our response is "no." The courts and the Water
Board have concurrent jurisdiction in cases of this kind. If the nature or complexity
of the issues indicate that an initial deternmination by the board is appropriate, tie
courts may refer the matter to the board.
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individuated by paragraph and particularized." Third, previous "notice to tile
legislature and agencies" was issued that "local public interests may interfere
27
with the public trust in the same manner as private profit-oriented interests."
NationalAudubon was about equitable justice. It was about more than a
traditional equitable remedy, which loomed in the background through the
request for injunctive relief. It was about how, for a while, "leinterprise triumphed over equity" when the "beneficial use" to which water was put went
unchecked.2 1 It was about "Itihe Mono Lake opinion and the public trust
doctrine (Prior raged, 'What kind of a court is this? Talking about brine
shrimp, gulls, Wilson's Phalarope, tufa-whatever the hell that is. This was
supposed to be a case about war). ' 2' a It was about judicial recognition of
instreaun uses that struck at the heart of the diversion "myth" of prior appropriation.' It was about the rise of the environmental movement and the swelling of city populations dependent on resources that they depleted. It was
about a return to the origins of the appropriative regime, which "expressed a
concern for broad and equitable distribution of resources" that was "radical"
in its opposition to monopolies and speculation.2
Uluitable justice also implied traditional equity. After all, if traditional
equity continues as a moral or ethical antidote to opportunism, the public trust
similarly "perseveres as a value system and an ethic" targeting "immoral and
illegal" conduct that is injurious to the public weal. "2 As such, opportunistic
conduct where the public trust is involved does not involve a bad faith violation of the law as much as how "self-interested and powerful minorities often
have undue influence on the public resource decisions of legislative and ad246. Id. at 715-16.
247.

Sax, supra note 108, at 514, 532-34. Also, as Sax points out:

In this respect ... it may be imnportlult to distinguish between a project which is
authorized by the state itself, either thlrough the legislature or through one of iLs adininistrative agencies, and one which is initiated and advanced merely by a local goveminent. The distinction does not suggest that a local project cannot be valid, but rather that local initiation invites a more substantial judicial scrutiny of the question
whether the public interest-the "general statewide intercst"-is being adequately advauced.

Id. at 541.

248. Pisani, supr, note 89, at 37.
249. Wilkinson, supra note 88, at xvii.
250. Klein, supm note 92, at 344.
251. Schorr, supra note 90, at 3, 11. Indeed, NationalAudubon stands in contradistinction
to some of the first California cases dealing with the public trust. There was similar sentiment at
the state's fornation:
A delegate to the state Constitutional Convention in 1879 said, "If there is any one
abuse greater than another that I think the people of the State of California has suffered at the hands of their law-making power, it is the abuse that they have received in
the granting out and disposition of the lands belonging to the State." Swanp lands,
tidelands, and overflowed lands had been taken in such vast quantities, he said, that
'now the people are hedged off entirely from reaching tide water, navigable water, or

salt water."
Sax, supra note 108, at 525 n.162.
252. Takacs, supra note 14, at 711-12.
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ministrative bodies and cause those bodies to ignore broadly based public interests." 3 Both traditional equity and the public trust weigh individual concerns against the public's larger policy imperatives.
That the public trust identifies the state "as a trustee of certain public resources" also aligns the public trust with traditional equity." F. W. Maitland's
influential work on equity lauded the creation of the trust, which was a "distinctive achievement" at equity.2 5 A trust was something created for the benefit of another:
IVhen a person has rights which he is bound to exercise upon behalf of another or for the accomplishment of some particular purpose he is said to
have those rights in trust for that other or for that purpose and he is called a
trustee. 2,

The public trust doctrine similarly holds that "those in power" should act as
stewards of the "gifts of nature's bounty." ' Indeed, that a trust at traditional
equity is also "'an institute' of great elasticity and generality; as elastic, as general as contract" recalls Sax's observation that the public trust doctrine "has no
life of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no more-and no less-than a
name courts give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic
process.'
For Sax, the public trust doctrine has a "substantive overtone"
even as it is not substantive itself since the doctrine is a "technique or name
courts used to mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative process or the democratic process generally. 2' ' As Richard Lazarus has
noted, the "doctrine [is]
historically bound up in notions of property law and
equitable trusts. ....
Thus both traditional equity and the public trust doctrine
share fiduciary concerns regarding a trust and the trust's content. The trust
imposed legal obligations on those who held the trust res for another's benefit.
National Audubon was thus about a holistic-and possibly empatheticapproach to the various constituencies dependent on water. What would become of them if the assault on their habitat continued? What elfect on the
humans who had long benefited from its waters?
D. THE TAINTED CONSCIENCE
Conscience matters. Although conscience appears as dictum in the recent
case law from Colorado, New Mexico, and California, the cases show that
conscience has a continuing place in discussions of equity. The Colorado Supreme Court has referred to "good conscience" in the context of trusts. ' The
253. Sax, supranote 108, at 560.
254. Id. at 478.
255. F. W. MAITLANI), EQUITY: A COURSE OF LFCrURES 23 (1947).
256. Id. at 44.
257. Takacs, supra note 14, at 711, 716.
258. MArrLAND, suprai note 255, at 23; Sax, supra note 108, at 521.
259. Iazarus, supia note 240, at 642-43 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marls omitted).
260. Lazarus, supra note 240, at 648, 692 ("The public trust doctrine ... inevitably dcpendlsi on traditional notions of property law and trusts").
261. Peterson v. McMahon, 99 P.3d 594, 598 (Colo. 2004) ("Because equity courts devel-
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Colorado Court of Appeals has noted that the "doctrine [of unclean hands] is
rooted in the historical concept of court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively
enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith. This presupposes a
refusal on its part to be 'the abetter of iniquity. ' The year of the Bounds
decision, tie Supreme Court of New Mexico referred to "equity and good
conscience" in a discussion of subrogation.'
Similarly, the year of the NationalAudubon decision, the Supreme Court of California referred to "equity
and good conscience" in a discussion of debt apportionment,"6 ' and the Court
of Appeal of California stated that "[the doctrine of punitive damnages has
never found favor in equity, the repository of the law's conscience" only a few
years before."
But on whose conscience did Ai-chuleta, Bounds, and NationalAudubon
depend? A recent family law case makes the versatility and power of a court
of equity more explicit. In that case, a spouse sued her husband for equitable
distribution of the marital assets. " ' The court held that a "court of equity, as a
court of conscience, can never permit itself to become party to the- division of
tainted assets nor can it grant the request of an admitted wrongdoer to arbitrate such a distribution."" The husband had "conspired with his employer to
skim large corporate and institutional oil deliveries (billing for more oil than
delivered). They would then sell the undelivered, excess oil to third parties." 8
Most galling was that "no inheritance, gift or income taxes were ever paid or
ever declared." 6 9
The court applied a historical understanding of equity:
Historically, courts of equity have reflected the collective public conscience
of what should and should not be done. Equity involves the obedience to

dictates of morality and conscience. The morality of which equity speaks is
oped the concept of a trust and equitable principles such as the requirements of 'good conscience' are used to enforce trusts and the fiduciary duties underlying trusts, litigation relating to
trusts has been treated as equitable even when solely monetary relief is sought.").
262. HealthSouth Corp. v. Boulder Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 220 P.3d 966, 977 (Colo. App.
2009) (Bernard, J., dissenting) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945)), rev'd, 246 P.3d 948 (Colo. 2011); see also Hickerson v.
Vessels, 316 P.3d 620, 623 (Colo. 2014) (laches); People v. Lanari, No.1 1CA2440, 2014 Colo.
App. LEXIS 934, at *P8 (Colo. App.June 5, 2014) (laches);Jehly v. Brown, 327 P.3d 351, 352
(Colo. App. 2014) (fraudulent concealment); Maxwell v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, No.
12CA1802, 2014 Colo. App. LEXIS 2, at *P1 (Colo. App. Jan. 2, 2014) (fraudulent concealment); People v. Shiftin, Nos. 11CA1853 & 11CA1881, 2014 Colo. App. LEXIS 308, at *P4,
12 (Colo. App. Feb. 27, 2014) (restitution); Kelso v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co., 262 P.3d 1001,
1004 (Colo. App. 2011) (independent equitable action).
263. Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc., 301 P.3d 387, 402 (N.M. 2013)
("The remedy is for the benefit of one secondarily liable who has paid the debt of another and
to whom rmiequity andgood coll cicnce should be assigned the rights and remedies of the original creditor." (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 431 P.2d
737, 741 (N.M. 1967))).
264. Jessup Farms v. Baldwin, 660 P.2d 813, 815, 820 n.7 (Cal. 1983) ("Under these circumstances, Jessup Farns paid no more than what in equity and good conscience it should
have paid.").
265. Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 251 (Cal. Ct.App. 1980).
266. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1068 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
267. Id.at 1068.
268. Id. at 1069.
269. Id.
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that of society and not the judge's personal view of right and wrong. Likewise, equity may not disregard statutory law but looks to its intent rather than
its form. As the ultimate respository [sic], the gatekeeper of that conscience
and morality, equity's forum can never be used to promote or condone
crime or clearly delined breaches of public moralit. -'0
The court reaffirmed its equitable obligations, noting that the "Legislature did
not intend its judges to be tellers or its court rooms counting houses for the
division of tainted assets purchased with dirty money. The policy of this state
is unambiguous in that regard: We do not reward wrongdoers!""' Appalled,
the court ruled that it would "report such wrongdoing to the appropriate authorities .....
Sheridim is about "conscience and morality" of which equity is both the
"gatekeeper" and "ultimate repository .... . That equitable conscience is generalized, as embodied in statutory and other laws, as well as public policy. Consistent with these principles, a court of conscience will not allow itself to be
"the abetter of iniquity."2"

The morality on which Sheridan relied was thus

local and equitable.Y5 A court sitting at equity was a court of outrage that could
not reward tainted consciences. 2 As such, the court could take extraordinary
steps to uphold its historical obligations.Y
Archuleta and Bounds similarly returned to traditional equitable principles. The Archuleta plaintiff had to show that he had suffered an injury for
injunctive relief to issue.
It was not enough that the plaintiff claim that the
defendant had ploughed up the plaintiff's water ditches and intercepted the
plaintiff's water.' In Bounds, it was not enough that the plaintiff claim that an
injunction should issue on the basis of his takings and other claims without
"substantial evidence of impairment..... It would thus be unconscientious for
a court of equity to succor someone who had not shown harm. Without such
a showing, a court of equity itself might succumb to the very conduct that it
seeks to cure.
"'

270. Id. at 1070 (citations omitted).
271. Jd.at1071.
272. Id at 1074. Although the wife had unclean hands, the court exercised its discretion in
the wifie's favor on her alimony, child support, and counsel fcc claims, noting that
Plaintiff's misconduct which resulted in the dismissal of her equitable distribution petition does not bar her request before the court for alimony, child support and counsel fees that are related to these issues. Courts of equity in applying the maxim of unclean hands must use just discretion in determining under what circumstances, to
what extent and what policy reasons will constitute cause to banish a litigant or to bar
her relief.
Id. at 1075.
273. [d.at 1070.
274. HealthSouth Corp. v. Boulder Cnty. BI. of Comnm'rs, 220 P.3d 966, 977 (Colo. App.
2009) (Bernard,J., dissenting), rev'd, 246 P.3d 948 (Colo. 2011).
275. See Sheridan, 589 A.2d at 1071-72.
276. See Sunstein, suipra note 188, at 407.
277. See Saunet, supra note 112, at 35.
278. Archuleta v. Gomnez, 200 P.3d 333, 346 (Colo. 2009).
279. Id. at 337, 349.
280. Bounds v. State, No. CV-2006-166, slip op. at 6 (N.M. 6th Dist- Ct.July 8, 2008).

WA TER LA W REVIEW

Volume 18

Conscience is also critical to the outcome of NationalAudubon. National
Audubon involved changing morality and public policy regarding water. 8 ' As
the court noted, "Itihe objective of the public trust has evolved in tandem with
the changing public perception of the values and uses of waterways." 82 As
such, the public trust doctrine both responded to and incorporated the moral
implications of treating a resource like water in a particular manner. 83 Previous treatment resulted in "apparent disregard for the resulting damage to the
scenery, ecology, and human uses of Mono Lake ."8 . Now the public trust
imposed a "duty" on the state "to protect the people's common heritage of
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection
only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purposes of the trust."+
If both traditional equity and the public trust doctrine nirror similar fiduciary concerns regarding a trust, then NationalAudubon is also about a fiduciary's failure to perform its equitable duties to the trust. Though National
Audubon never frames its opinion in these terms, the opinion catalogs the
damage wrought by a state agency's understanding of its duty. The agency argued that the public trust doctrine was "'subsumed' into the appropriative wa86
ter rights system and, absorbed by that body of law, quietly disappeared."
Following this argument, the depletion of the trust's resources was no legal
damage at all. The court not only rejected the claim, but also implied that the
agency's position was unconscientious. The opening of the case elucidated
this fact. As if the court described an imperiled community of various plaintiffs that could not sue on their own behalf, NationalAudubon opens with a
description of Mono Lake and its non-human inhabitants.8 Equitable justice,
281.

See generallyT. Leigh Anenson, From Theorv to Practice:Analyzing Equitable Estop-

pcl UnderA PluralisticMIodel of Law, 1I LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 633, 659 (2007) ("equity has
come to be regarded as public policy. It bears repeating that equity and public policy promote
the same purpose of change based on modem morality."); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, Fquity's
Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century's Equitable Reformation of

Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 265, 333 (1999) ("In short, the equitable principles are
often synonymous with the public policy behind the legal rules of contract. 'Public policy, like
equity, is the name for a precise set of legal standards which lie at the bedrock of the legal systen.'").
282. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983).
283. See generally Emily L. Dawson & Lincoln L. Davies, EnvironmentalLaw and Policy:
Nature, Law, and Society, 19 STAN. ENvrt.. L,. 469, 473 (2000) (reviewing ZYGMUNT J.B.
PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND Poiicy: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY (1999)) (noting that the "portentous" first chapter includes discussion of the moral implications of the public trust doctrine).
284. Nat'lAudubon Soc)v, 658 P.2d at 729.
285. Id. at 724.
286. Id. at 727.
287. Id. at 711. The court stated:
Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California, sits at the base of the Sierra Nevada
escarpment near the eastern entrance to Yosemite National Park. The lake is saline;
it contains no fish but supports a large population of brine shrimp which feed vast
numbers of nesting and migratory birds. Islands in the lake protect a large breeding
colony of California gulls, and the lake itself serves as a haven on the migration route
for thousands of Northern Phalarope, Wilson's Phalarope, and Eared Grebe. Towers and spires of tufa on the north and south shores are matters of geological interest
and a tourist attraction.
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with its attention to the many constituencies dependent upon a given resource,
was thus about conscience. It demonstrated how a failure of conscience-for
some, a failure of empathy-could lead to a tainted landscape."
But whose conscience did Archuleta, Bounds, and National Audubon
apply? Sheridan, the family law case, applied state precedent reflecting local
morality, and also local ethical rules governing judicial conduct."a Archuleta
and Bounds similarly applied traditional equitable principles that are familiar
to almost every equitable court; no injury means no equity. These principles,
and the morality inhering in them, are the province of equity in general and
are not limited to a specific jurisdiction. In NalionalAudubon, the court relied almost exclusively on local precedent when discussing perceptions of the
public trust doctrine, which had predecessors at both English common law
and Roman law. The three cases were not about subjective inklings of individual chancellors, but were highly attentive to local equitable needs.
IV. CONCLUSION
From the first prior appropriation cases, injunctive relief proved critical, as
it allowed litigants to anticipate prospective enforcement of their water rights.
Conscience matters. Through conscience, courts can innovate the law while
relying on local or other conditions to arrive at a conscientious outcome. As
such, conscience is of continuing importance in water rights discussions as it
provides the moral grounding on which a court might build its response to a
question of public importance. Conscience can be outcome-determinative.
Conscience thus remains a powerful equitable tool of ongoing importance
whose importance should not be elided in water rights discussions.
Prior appropriation thus needs equity for a variety of reasons. Roughly
forty-six million Americans are subject to some fonn of prior appropriation in
Colorado, New Mexico, and California each day. Equity is key because it can
help courts attend to the conscientious needs of citizens, agencies, and organizations, as well as laws with which courts must contend when adjudicating water rights cases. A failure of conscience can lead to damage. Such damage
can be long-lasting, and multiple constituencies can feel its effects. Indeed,
some constituencies have no way of articulating or resisting the threat to their
existence posed by unconscientious and inequitable conduct. Thus, they have
no way of being actual "plaintiffis] in an imperfect world, one marred by the
defendant's violation."
Especially in such cases, it may, therefore, be good
"that the chancellor ride[] again." 9'

I,
288. See Feldman &Whitman, supra note 41, at 307-08 (arguing that empathy is "the moral
capacity to regard non-sentient beings as objects to be cared for and to be regarded as having
intrinsic-not merely utilitarian-value," and "communicat ing], negoiiatlingl, or engagling in an
inter-active decisional process so as to acknowledge not only the moral standing of these organisms, but also the possibility that they have 'agency."').
289. Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1071-72 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
290. Rendlemnan, supra note 20, at 1404.
291. Bray, supranote 2, at 60.

